This paper analyzes the implications for turnover of costly job-specific training. The presence of such costs in a search model implies that turnover decisions reduce the value of potential trades that are available to other market participants. There is too much turnover because of this external effect, and, therefore, too much retraining. When the investment in job training is endogenous, inefficient turnover again occurs, and the investment in specific skills is inefficiently high. The interactions between skill acquisition and turnover imply that it is essentially impossible for a brokerage institution to achieve efficiency.

A basic tool of modern econometrics is a uniform law of large numbers (LLN). It is a primary ingredient used in proving consistency and asymptotic normality of parametric and nonparametric estimators in nonlinear econometric models. Thus, in a well-known review article, Burguete, Gallant, and Sousa [8, p. 162] introduce a uniform LLN with the statement: following theorem is the result upon which the asymptotic theory of nonlinear econometrics rests. So pervasive is the use of uniform LLNs, that numerous authors appeal to an unspecified generic uniform LLN. Others appeal to some specific result. The purpose of this paper is to provide a generic uniform LLN that is sufficiently general to incorporate most applications of uniform LLNs in the nonlinear econometrics literature. In summary, the paper presents a result that can be used to turn state of the art pointwise LLNs into uniform LLNs over compact sets, with the addition of a single smoothness condition -- either a Lipschitz condition or a derivative condition. The latter is particularly easy to verify, and is implied by common assumptions used to prove asymptotic normality of estimators. Thus, the additional condition is not particularly restrictive. In contrast to other uniform LLNs that appear in the literature, the one given here allows the full range of heterogeneity of summands (i.e., non-identical distributions), and temporal dependence, that is available with pointwise LLNs.

Private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the U.S. economy. The majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos (i.e., between living persons), but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior. This paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers. Two motives are considered: altruism and exchange. Evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior. Observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange-related motives. This finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well-being. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Amit Bhaduri, Donald J. Harris; The Complex Dynamics of the Simple Ricardian System*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 102, Issue 4, 1 November 1

[In this study, sections of working papers from audits performed by one office of a public accounting firm were obtained and investigated. The working papers contained the information documented from the preliminary evaluation of internal control over the accounts receivable/sales area. Data from the working papers were provided as input, and discriminant analysis was used to construct a descriptive model of the auditor preliminary evaluation judgments. The model correctly predicted about 80 percent of the individual auditor judgments, which is significantly more accurate than a chance model, and the importance of the presence or absence of particular control activities on the auditors' evaluations was investigated from the model.]

ABSTRACT: In this study, sections of working papers from audits performed by one office of a public accounting firm were obtained and investigated. The working papers contained the Information documented from the preliminary evaluation of internal control over the accounts receivable/sales area. Data from the working papers were provided as Input, and discriminant analysis was used to construct a descriptive model of the auditor preliminary evaluation judgments. The model correctly predicted about 80 percent of the individual auditor judgments, which is significantly more accurate than a chance model, end the importance of the presence or absence of particular control activities on the auditors' evaluations was investigated from the model.