Exploiting a unique identification strategy based on inaccurate news analytics, we document an effect of news analytics on the market independent of the informational content of the news. We show that news analytics speed up the stock price and trading volume response to articles, but reduce liquidity. Inaccurate news analytics lead to small price distortions that are corrected quickly. The market impact of news analytics is greatest for press releases, as news analytics exhibit a particular skill in “seeing through” the positive spin of press releases. Furthermore, we provide evidence that high-frequency traders rely on the information from news analytics for directional trading on company-specific news. Received: May 17, 2018; Editorial decision: June 14, 2019 by Editor: Thierry Foucault. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

ABSTRACT Recent accounting research indicates that capital markets price firms' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that disclosed emissions levels are negatively associated with firms' market values. The departure point for this study is to investigate whether investors value firms differently based on the strategies firms use to mitigate GHG emissions. These strategies include making operational changes, which reduces emissions attributable to the firm, and purchasing offsets, which reduces emissions unattributable to the firm. Using an experiment, we hold constant a firm's financial performance, investment in emissions mitigation, and net emissions, and find evidence that nonprofessional investors perceive the firm to be more valuable when it primarily uses an operational change strategy versus an offsets strategy. However, consistent with theory, this result only occurs when the firm's prior sustainability performance is below the industry average and not when it is above the industry average. This difference in firm value is consistent with the notion that nonprofessional investors believe information about a firm's emissions management strategy is material. Supplemental exploratory analyses reveal that our results are mediated by investors' perception that an operational change strategy is more socially and environmentally responsible than an offsets strategy for below industry average firms. Implications for our findings on theory and practice are discussed.

ABSTRACT Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior finding of more effort under penalty contracts than bonus contracts (i.e., the contract frame effect) persists when workers can choose their contract and know that their employer intentionally offered the contract they choose. As predicted, these features of labor markets eliminate the difference in effort between penalty and bonus contracts reported in prior studies. This finding suggests employers may use bonus contracts more often than penalty contracts because they can offer the contract most workers prefer without sacrificing worker effort.