Etude de jeux cooperatifs qui sont des jeux a plusieurs joueurs mis sous la forme de coalition dans lesquels l'utilite n'est pas supposee etre transferable

THE MAIN PURPOSE of this paper is to provide an axiomatic approach to marginal cost (MC) pricing and to point out its similarity with Aumann-Shapley (A-S) pricing. The latter is a cost-sharing price mechanism discussed in [3 and 6] that is derived from a set of five natural axioms. In this paper we consider models in which there is one producer with a given technology who faces fixed input prices and produces a finite number of consumption goods. Thus, we can uniquely derive the cost function that describes the minimal cost of producing a given vector of consumption goods. By a price mechanism P(., ) we mean a rule or a function that associates with each cost function F and vector a of quantities, a vector of prices:

Fifty years ago, Harsanyi published the first of his seminal two papers on utilitarianism. His results were derived within the von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility theory. A year later, Savage incorporated subjective probability into expected utility theory in his famous book. In this note we extend Harsanyi’s utilitarianism to Savage’s framework. We show that a Pareto condition implies utilitarian aggregation: both society’s utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals. This conclusion contrasts the impossibility of reconciling a Pareto condition and linear aggregation of beliefs and tastes, that was noted by several authors. We argue that the indiscriminate Pareto condition considered by these authors is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows the extension of Harsanyi’s result to Savage’s framework.

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