We examine the cost of liquidity in rates on CDs purchased by money market funds (MMFs). We find no evidence that rates vary directly with the size of CDs. However, we do find that large MMFs receive higher rates on large CDs than small MMFs. This suggests banks pay for (potential) liquidity.

We examine how community banks respond to liquidity shocks created by natural disasters. We address community banks’ responses to liquidity shocks due to their focused geographic and economic presence, which coincide with their communities’ exposure to the disasters and the ability of the local banks to meet their needs. We find that community banks respond to liquidity shocks by managing their balance sheet, rather than any single balance sheet account. In particular, we find that they respond to the liquidity needs of their communities by increasing loans as deposits are withdrawn.

From the inception of money market funds (MMFs), all MMFs reported a fixed $1 NAV (Net Asset Value). In July 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new regulations for MMFs that require Prime institutional MMFs to report floating NAVs. The SEC did not expect a significant impact on the MMF industry from requiring floating NAVs for Prime institutional funds. We find that over 70% of the assets under management in Prime MMFs left Prime funds with over half the Prime funds closing. We find that more than half of the Prime retail MMFs (which are not required to switch to floating NAV) closed with more than 50% of the assets under management exiting these funds. Finally, we find that for every dollar that exited Prime MMFs a dollar was added to Government MMFs. Based on the SEC's economic discussions, these results all represent unexpected consequences.

This paper provides empirical evidence on the economic value of services provided by independent auditors by analyzing whether auditor association leads to reduced interest rates on revolving credit agreements. Using multivariate regressions, we analyze the relation between interest rates on revolving bank loans to small, private firms and the degree of auditor association with the financial statements provided to the lender,

Risk-shifting window dressing and a preferred habitat for liquidity have been offered as possible explanations as to why US money market rates are higher before the year-end than afterwards. The two hypotheses differ in the timing of the rate decline at the year-end and the evidence on the timing of the decline supports the preferred habitat hypothesis in US money markets. This paper extends this line of research to the behavior of international short-term interest rates at year-ends and quarter-ends using London interbank offer rates (LIBOR) for 11 different currencies. The results suggest that the behavior of LIBOR for five currencies: the US Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, and German Mark is consistent with year-end or quarter-end preferred habitats for liquidity. Other currencies do not demonstrate consistently distinct patterns in turn-of-the-year and turn-of-the-quarter yields. None of the results provides any support for risk-shifting window dressing.

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.

We focus on market-making costs by examining the daily bid–ask spreads for off-the-run, one-month Treasury bills around two liquidity-changing events. Event one, Salomon Brothers’ supply shock, results in a roughly 2.5-basis-point increase in the spread because of an increase in ask prices; and event two, the Long-Term Capital Management demand shock, results in a doubling of the spread because of a decrease in bid prices. Our results provide a benchmark for researchers examining bid–ask spreads of securities that include a liquidity premium, a risk premium, and an asymmetric information premium.