A Note on the Terms of Trade of Nigeria E. K. Hawkins E. K. Hawkins Ibadan, Nigeria Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 22, Issue 1, 1954, Pages 47–56, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296223 Published: 01 January 1954

Journal Article Expectations, Uncertainty and Inventory Fluctuations Get access E. S. Mills E. S. Mills University College of North Staffordshire Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 22, Issue 1, 1954, Pages 15–22, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296220 Published: 01 January 1954

Introduction, 19. — I. The theory of interest rate structure, 19. — II. Origin and evolution of the rate structure, 27. — III. Effects of maintenance of the yield pattern, 27. — IV. Significance to credit policy of maintaining the yield structure, 36. — V. Conclusions for policy, 40. — VI. Interest rate structures and compensatory open market operations, 41.

I. Introduction, 323. — II. The Walrasian model, 325; the household sector, 325; the entrepreneurial sector, 336; the investment sector, 341; secondary conditions, 344. — III. Criticism of the Walrasian model, 345; the static nature of the model, 345; the purely competitive nature of the model, 347; the omission of important sectors from the model, 349. — IV. The Leontief open system, 349.

THE United States, through her policy of economic assistance, first in the form of the Marshall Plan and since I952 in the form of Mutual Aid, has helped many friendly countries to recover from the ravages of war without any appreciable reduction in living standards. Had the United States not come to the rescue, a highly developed area like Western Europe would have been forced to adjust herself in one way or another to hard economic circumstances. In the process she would surely have had to suffer a decline in living standards productive of social unrest and possibly of communal strife sufficiently violent to have brought into power in some countries political parties of extreme doctrines and hostile toward the United States. If that danger has been avoided, it is by no means over. Though production in the rest of the world, and in Western Europe in particular, has recovered and advanced beyond its prewar standards, there is still some evidence of a dollar shortage suggestive of a structural disequilibrium which is unlikely to be solved with the mere passage of time. The question naturally arises what further measures might be undertaken by the interested countries to promote the expansion of world trade on a multilateral basis. If we agree that in the immediate future the prospects of a substantial contribution to this end by West European countries are rather poor, our main concern will be to reconsider the efficacy of those policies by which, it is frequently alleged, the United States might further contribute toward its realization. First, however, let us appraise briefly the existing imbalance. From June I95I to June I952 the United States current account had a surplus of $4,I00 million.' From June I952 to June I953 the current account surplus was roughly $68 million. One concludes the United States surplus on current account is tending to disappear completely, a conclusion which has promoted some cautious optimism. But optimism is warranted only if the situation has been brought about without further trade restrictions; in the present situation, that would be largely by an expansion of the value of to the United States in a way which would be unlikely to prove merely temporary. Glancing at the figures we discover that, of the reduction in the surplus from $4,I00 million to the present insignificant figure, the in to the United States accounted for less than $I,400 million. Of this increase in exports to the United States, about $500 million was an in United States government expenditure on purchases by its personnel abroad, and an estimated $250 million was on offshore purchases. Of the reduction in from the United States of close to $2.6 billion, a small part was accounted for by an in the output of coal in Western Europe and by better harvests abroad. The remainder is attributable largely to the effects of a further of import restrictions abroad in late I95 i and in I952. If these import restrictions are considered temporary, then the potential deficit is still very large. It would be larger still if the political situation were other than it is. For then the United States item imports of government services, which provided some $I,900 million in the period I952-53, would be reduced to a fraction of this sum. As a final damper to the optimism, it may be pointed out that should the high level of economic activity in the United States recede, even slightly as in I949, to the United States would fall off rapidly. At any event it must not be assumed that as soon as the surplus in the United States balance This figure results when we include government of services (largely on its military personnel abroad), offshore purchases both for the United States forces stationed abroad and NATO forces, and private remittances, and when we exclude all military-aid (in the form of goods and services).

RECENT contributors 1 to the discussion of the effect of union bargaining power on labor's earnings have given only passing attention to one important facet of this problem: the influence of union pressure on the distributive share of income generated by industry that is paid to labor. While statistics have been gathered and studies made 2 of aggregate distributive shares, little attempt has been made to develop analysis around interand intraindustry comparisons of wage-income structures in the light of union growth. The purpose of this paper is to take one step toward a consideration of statistical data of the last two decades and test the hypothesis that where wage earners are strongly organized in trade unions, one might expect labour to succeed in obtaining a larger share of the product than elsewhere. 3

It is an established principle of accountancy that assets and liabilities which are expressed in a currency other than that in which the capital is expressed, are to be converted into the currency of the capital. This principle follows quite naturally from the fundamental proposition that accounting is the art to record the history of a capital in the sense of a fund set aside for a particular business purpose. The rules that all assets and liabilities in foreign currency are to be converted into the currency of the share capital has one exception in the case in which the share capital was for technical reasons, expressed in a currency different from that in which it was intended to be invested. In that case, the balance sheet is to be expressed in the intended currency as soon as this becomes technically possible and the share capital from that date onward, must be converted into the intended currency at the rate of exchange in force at the date on which the conversion became first possible.

Most of the everyday problems which plague practicing accountants in the realm of inventory accounting are somewhat divorced from the theory of inventory valuation and its inevitable relationship to income determination. Any accountant worth his salt has learned long ago to shy away from the word "value." The "value" of something implies its worth, and one doesn't have to be a timid soul to shudder at the insuperable problems which surround an attempt to determine the worth of anything. Value theory tells that such inventories must be worth the present discounted amount of the net receipts which will ultimately flow into the business as a result of their sale. The barrier which stands between value theory and the accounting treatment of inventories is essentially the realization convention. When a sale takes place, or where production under a fixed contract occurs, or where production of goods which sell on an organized market at given prices is completed in all these cases the accountant is willing to grant that the evidence is satisfactory.