I provide evidence that investors overweight analyst forecasts by demonstrating that prices do not fully reflect predictable components of analyst errors, which conflicts with conclusions in prior research. I highlight estimation bias in traditional approaches and develop a new approach that reduces this bias. I estimate characteristic forecasts that map current firm characteristics into forecasts of future earnings. Contrasting characteristic and analyst forecasts predicts analyst forecast errors and revisions. I find abnormal returns to strategies that sort firms by predicted forecast errors, consistent with investors overweighting analyst forecasts and predictable biases in analyst forecasts influencing the information content of prices.

This study documents a six-fold increase in short-term return reversals during earnings announcements relative to non-announcement periods. Following prior research, we use reversals as a proxy for expected returns market makers demand for providing liquidity. Our findings highlight significant time-series variation in the magnitude of short-term return reversals and suggest that market makers demand higher expected returns prior to earnings announcements because of increased inventory risks that stem from holding net positions through the release of anticipated earnings news. Collectively, our findings suggest that uncertainty regarding anticipated information events elicits predictable increases in the compensation demanded for providing liquidity and that these increases significantly affect the dynamics and information content of market prices.

ABSTRACT We develop a measure of how information events impact investors' expectations of risk. The measure is broadly applicable and simple to implement. We derive it from an option‐pricing model, where investors anticipate an announcement that simultaneously conveys information on the announcer's expected future cash flows and risk profile. We empirically implement the measure using firms' earnings announcements, showing that it closely aligns with our model's predictions and offers strong forecasting power for firms' risk profiles, costs of capital, and future investments. We further highlight pitfalls of using simple changes in option‐implied volatilities to study information gleaned from earnings announcements. Finally, we apply our measure to study disclosure regulation, the efficacy of text‐based proxies, and market‐wide events, which we use to illustrate our measure's uses, and illuminate its potential limitations.

[It is well established that value stocks outperform glamour stocks, yet considerable debate exists about whether the return differential reflects compensation for risk or mispricing. Under mispricing explanations, prices of glamour (value) firms reflect systematically optimistic (pessimistic) expectations; thus, the value/glamour effect should be concentrated (absent) among firms with (without) ex ante identifiable expectation errors. Classifying firms based upon whether expectations implied by current pricing multiples are congruent with the strength of their fundamentals, we document that value/glamour returns and ex post revisions to market expectations are predictably concentrated (absent) among firms with ex ante biased (unbiased) market expectations.]

We examine the relation between firms' voluntary guidance and mandatory 8K filings. We find a negative relation between guidance and 8Ks, which strengthens following the 2004 expansion of mandatory 8K requirements, consistent with firms using the disclosures as substitutes. Increases in 8Ks coincide with declines in firms’ profits, but this negative relation weakens after the 2004 regulation, consistent with firms broadening the scope of information conveyed through 8Ks. Together, our findings suggest firms became more reliant on 8Ks to convey general types of information after the 2004 regulation, rather than primarily negative news, which reduces their incentives to issue guidance.

ABSTRACT We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.

Using novel earnings calendar data, we show that firms’ advanced scheduling of earnings announcement dates foreshadows their earnings news. Firms that schedule later-than-expected announcement dates subsequently announce worse news than those scheduling earlier-than-expected announcement dates. Despite scheduling disclosures being observable weeks ahead of earnings announcements, we show that equity markets fail to reflect the information in these disclosures until the announcement itself. By also showing that option markets respond efficiently to volatility-timing information embedded in the same scheduling disclosures, we provide novel evidence that markets fail to react to information about future earnings despite investors immediately trading on the underlying signal.

We examine the information content of option and equity volumes when trade direction is unobserved. In a multimarket asymmetric information model, equity short-sale costs result in a negative relation between relative option volume and future firm value. In our empirical tests, firms in the lowest decile of the option to stock volume ratio (O/S) outperform the highest decile by 0.34% per week (19.3% annualized). Our model and empirics both indicate that O/S is a stronger signal when short-sale costs are high or option leverage is low. O/S also predicts future firm-specific earnings news, consistent with O/S reflecting private information.

It is well established that value stocks outperform glamour stocks, yet considerable debate exists about whether the return differential reflects compensation for risk or mispricing. Under mispricing explanations, prices of glamour (value) firms reflect systematically optimistic (pessimistic) expectations; thus, the value/glamour effect should be concentrated (absent) among firms with (without) ex ante identifiable expectation errors. Classifying firms based upon whether expectations implied by current pricing multiples are congruent with the strength of their fundamentals, we document that value/glamour returns and ex post revisions to market expectations are predictably concentrated (absent) among firms with ex ante biased (unbiased) market expectations.

We show that analyst coverage proxies contain information about expected returns. We decompose analyst coverage into abnormal and expected components using a simple characteristic-based model and show that firms with abnormally high analyst coverage subsequently outperform firms with abnormally low coverage by approximately 80 basis points per month. We also show abnormal coverage rises following exogenous shocks to underpricing and predicts improvements in firms’ fundamental performance, suggesting that return predictability stems from analysts more heavily covering underpriced stocks. Our findings highlight the usefulness of analysts’ actions in expected return estimations, and a potential inference problem when coverage proxies are used to study information asymmetry and dissemination.