The present paper uses credit card securitization data to show that recourse to securitized debt may benefit short- and long-term stock returns and long-term operating performance of sponsors. Therefore, although recourse violates regulatory guidelines and FASB140, recourse may have beneficial effects for sponsors by revealing that the shocks that made recourse necessary are transitory. Sponsors providing recourse do, however, experience an abnormal delay in their normal issuance cycle around the event. Hence, it appears that the asset-backed securities market is like the commercial paper market, where a firm’s ability to issue is directly correlated with credit quality.

Abstract We show that installing stronger risk management into financial institutions—a proposal widely discussed following the 2008 financial crisis—is insufficient to constrain institutions’ exposure to investment with lurking risk, such as asset-backed securities (ABS). Regulations affect the functioning of risk management: risk management constrains institutions’ exposure to risky ABS when they face mark-to-market reporting combined with capital requirements; however, this role is considerably weaker when capital requirements are combined with historical cost accounting. We find suggestive evidence that financial regulations affect risk management functions through promoting risk managers’ efforts in uncovering ABS risk and curbing executives’ incentives to take excessive risk. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.