In many cities, incentives and regulations lead developers to integrate low-income housing into market-rate buildings. How cost-effective are these policies? I study take-up of a tax incentive in New York City using a model in which developers trade off between tax savings and pretax income. Estimating the model using policy variation and microdata on development from 2003 to 2015, I find a citywide marginal fiscal cost of $1.6 million per low-income unit. Differences in neighborhoods, not developer incidence, explain the cost premium over other housing programs. Weighing costs against estimates of neighborhood effects, I conclude middle-class neighborhoods offer “opportunity bargains.”

We assess the welfare consequences of occupational licensing for workers and consumers. We estimate a model of labour market equilibrium in which licensing restricts labour supply but also affects labour demand via worker quality and selection. On the margin of occupations licensed differently between U.S. states, we find that licensing raises wages and hours but reduces employment. We estimate an average welfare loss of 12% of occupational surplus. Workers and consumers respectively bear 70% and 30% of the incidence. Higher willingness to pay offsets 80% of higher prices for consumers, and higher wages compensate workers for 60% of the cost of mandated investment in occupation-specific human capital. Welfare effects appear more favourable in occupations in which licensing is more common.