Konchitchki and Patatoukas Journal of Accounting and Economics 57 (1-2), 76–88, (2014a) show that aggregate accounting earnings growth predicts future nominal gross domestic product (GDP) growth and that professional macro forecasters do not fully incorporate the information contained in aggregate accounting earnings. Based on results from prior literature, which find that accounting earnings reflect bad economic news in a timelier manner than good news, we condition Konchitchki and Patatoukas’s GDP growth forecast model on the sign of earnings changes. We show that negative changes in aggregate earnings predict future GDP growth while positive changes in earnings do not. Furthermore, we show that professional macro forecasters underreact to the information contained in negative changes in aggregate earnings about future GDP growth. Additional tests suggest our findings are a result of conservative accruals in earnings.

Our study examines the effect of corporate tax outcomes on forced CEO turnover. While prior research argues that firms often do not engage in tax avoidance due to reputational concerns, the empirical evidence suggesting the existence of reputational costs is scarce. In a broad sample of firms, we find evidence of a relation between the payment of low taxes and forced turnover. We also find that forced CEO turnover is more likely when the firm pays a high tax rate relative to its peers. Our results are consistent with the existence of previously unexplored individual reputational costs for not engaging in tax avoidance.

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.

This study examines the effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) on corporate defined benefit pension contributions. The TCJA decreases the corporate tax rate from 35 percent in 2017 to 21 percent in 2018 and thereafter. This change incentivizes firms to increase 2017 pension contributions to take advantage of tax deductions at a higher rate. Consistent with this incentive, we find firms increase defined benefit pension contributions by an average of 25 to 31 percent in 2017 compared with earlier years. We also find that taxpaying firms are the primary contributors. Further, taxpaying firms with high levels of pension‐related deferred tax assets contribute over three times as much as taxpaying firms with low levels of pension‐related deferred tax assets. We also find firms that increase pension contributions in 2017 reduce 2018 contributions, consistent with intertemporal income shifting rather than a permanent change in pension funding strategy.

We examine whether the change in earnings announcement textual tone, aggregated across individual publicly traded firms, helps predict gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The literature finds that changes in aggregate accounting earnings do help predict GDP growth, but only when aggregate earnings changes are negative. Because conservative accounting rules limit managers' ability to communicate positive news promptly, we examine the tone of quarterly corporate earnings announcements as a possible source of timely positive information provided by firms. We find that the change in aggregate tone in the earnings announcements from the same quarter in the previous year predicts one‐quarter‐ahead GDP growth, but only when the change is positive. Our study contributes to the literature by investigating the relation between aggregate corporate disclosure tone and macroeconomic outcomes.

We quantify the immediate net effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) on the tax burden of corporate profits for public US corporations. We find similar reductions in effective tax rates for domestic and multinational firms, yet the entirety of multinational tax savings stemmed from tax savings on their domestic, not foreign, earnings. We find no significant change in the federal tax burden on foreign earnings neither on average norspecifically for firms most likely to be subject to new anti‐abuse provisions. We find some evidence that firms not targeted by anti‐abuse provisions saw reductions in their federal tax burden on foreign income. Overall, while the tax burden on domestic income decreased significantly, our findings suggest the tax burden on the foreign earnings of US multinationals is largely unaffected despite the overhaul of the international tax system. Importantly for US multinationals' investment decisions, while foreign income was heavily tax‐favored prior to tax reform, we find that foreign and domestic incomes are similarly taxed after TCJA enactment.