Theory predicts that the quality of a firm's information disclosure can affect the term structure of its corporate bond yield spreads. Using cross-sectional regression and Nelson-Siegel yield curve estimation, I find that firms with higher Association for Investment Management and Research disclosure rankings tend to have lower credit spreads. Moreover, this transparency spread is especially large among short-term bonds. These findings are consistent with the theory of discretionary disclosure as well as the incomplete accounting information model of Duffie and Lando (Econometrica 69 (2001) 633). The presence of a sizable short-term transparency spread can attenuate some of the empirical problems associated with structural credit risk models.

[We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristics of a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. We find that the strategies requiring more "intellectual capital" to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controlling for bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphas remain significant even after taking into account typical hedge fund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, many of the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positively skewed returns. These results suggest that there may be more economic substance to fixedincome arbitrage than simply "picking up nickels in front of a steamroller."]

We examine whether adding more founding family members as firm owners and/or managers matters to corporate governance outcomes. Based on a sample of 1242 founder-controlled publicly traded Chinese private-sector firms, we find that more such family involvement is associated with lower volumes of related party transactions suspicious of expropriating shareholder wealth. The curtailing relation is stronger when family members own firm shares and/or serve as managers, and are more arm's-length relatives instead of immediate kin of the founders. The intra-family governance effects are stronger when firms are subject to weaker capital market disciplines or have more free cash under insider discretion. The overall evidence is consistent with founding family members' information advantages and ownership incentives making them more robust monitors of managerial decisions than other formal mechanisms, which help enforce shareholder rights in emerging markets.

Using a two-firm dynamic model, we investigate whether firms’ corporate policies are impacted by the peers’ idiosyncratic technology shocks. A firm hit by the positive idiosyncratic technology shock becomes more productive. Thus, it is better off. As a result, its Cournot competitor is worse off. Therefore, their optimal decisions are opposite to each other, leading to negative correlations between corporate policies across the firms. The empirical analysis using the idiosyncratic technology shocks and, to a lesser extent, CEO sudden deaths supports this prediction. Our analysis suggests that mimicking peers who alter their corporate policies due to idiosyncratic technology shocks destroys shareholder value.

This study analyzes whether corporate financing policies of the US industrial firms have depended on borrowing costs during the last forty years. The results show that the impact is either zero or slightly negative. Even in the latter case, the results are economically insignificant. Overall, our findings suggest that firms do not adjust their capital structures based on interest rates, except when market participants expect that real gross domestic product growth will be negative. Using a dynamic partial equilibrium model, we show that relatively high leverage adjustment costs are able to explain the weak negative relation between interest rates and a firm's leverage. Our results are also consistent with the view that firms target debt-to-asset ratio rather than debt level.

We study the determination of liquidity provision in the single-name credit default swap (CDS) market as measured by the number of distinct dealers providing quotes. We find that liquidity is concentrated among large obligors and those near the investment-grade/speculative-grade cutoff. Consistent with endogenous liquidity provision by informed financial institutions, more liquidity is associated with obligors for which there is a greater information flow from the CDS market to the stock market ahead of major credit events. Furthermore, the level of information heterogeneity plays an important role in how liquidity provision responds to transaction demand and how liquidity is priced into the CDS premium.

How do bondholders view the existence of an open market for corporate control? Between 1985 and 1991, 30 states in the U.S. enacted business combination (BC) laws, raising the cost of corporate takeovers. Relying on these exogenous events, we estimate the influence of the market for corporate control on the cost of debt. We identify different channels through which an open market for corporate control can benefit or harm bondholders: a reduction in managerial slack or the “quiet life,” resulting in higher profitability and firm value; a coinsurance effect, in which firms become less risky after being acquired; and an increasing leverage effect, in which bondholder wealth is expropriated through leverage-increasing takeovers. Consistent with the first two mechanisms, we find that the cost of debt rose after the passage of the BC laws; moreover, it rose sharply for firms in non-competitive industries, and for firms rated speculative-grade. In contrast, there is virtually no effect for firms in competitive industries, or firms rated investment-grade.

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for how risk preferences of a firm’s manager impact a firm’s optimal financing policy and shareholder value. The developed model implies that firms in growing industries are more valuable if they are run by more risk-seeking managers. Similarly, firms operating in declining industries should be run by less risk-seeking managers. Given that a firm’s optimal assets do not depend on the growth opportunities, and that debt is the difference between assets and equity, the model implies that there is a negative (positive) correlation between the riskiness of CEOs’ compensation packages and firms’ financial leverage ratios for firms in growing (declining) industries. This prediction is in stark contrast to economic intuition and prior literature in that less risk aversion normally should increase risk-taking. The empirical analysis generally supports all the model’s implications except those related to firms operating in declining industries.

We find that the magnitude of unique credit default swap (CDS) market information (constructed to be orthogonal to contemporaneous and lagged stock returns) declined after recent reforms that increased the level of post-trade regulatory and market transparency for CDSs. Around the same reforms, the ability of this CDS-unique information to predict future stock returns decreased. These results suggest the CDS market has become less of a “hidden” trading venue for informed investors since central clearing and trade reporting started.

We conduct an analysis of the risk and return characteristics of a number of widely used fixed-income arbitrage strategies. We find that the strategies requiring more “intellectual capital” to implement tend to produce significant alphas after controlling for bond and equity market risk factors. These positive alphas remain significant even after taking into account typical hedge fund fees. In contrast with other hedge fund strategies, many of the fixed-income arbitrage strategies produce positively skewed returns. These results suggest that there may be more economic substance to fixed-income arbitrage than simply “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller.”