In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 crisis, banks claiming positive diversification benefits are being met with skepticism. Nevertheless, diversification might be important and sizable for some large internationally active banking groups. We use a universally applicable correlation matrix approach to calculate international diversification effects, in which bank subsidiaries are treated as individual assets of the banking group portfolio. We apply the framework to 49 of the world's largest banking groups with significant foreign business units over the 1992–2009 period. Focusing on the most important risk in banking, credit risk, we find that allowing for geographical diversification could reduce banks’ credit risk by 1.1% on average, with risk reduction ranging from negligible up to 8%.

We examine how alumni ties with corporate boards differentially affect male and female analysts' job performance and career outcomes. Connections improve analysts' forecasting accuracy and recommendation impact, but the effect is two to three times as large for men as for women. Connections also contribute to analysts' likelihood of being voted by institutional investors as "star" analysts, but act as a partial substitute to performance for men, while a complement to performance for women. Our evidence indicates that men benefit more than women from connections in both job performance and the subjective evaluation by others.

By reaching a broad population of investors, mass media can alleviate informational frictions and affect security pricing even if it does not supply genuine news. We investigate this hypothesis by studying the cross-sectional relation between media coverage and expected stock returns. We find that stocks with no media coverage earn higher returns than stocks with high media coverage even after controlling for well-known risk factors. These results are more pronounced among small stocks and stocks with high individual ownership, low analyst following, and high idiosyncratic volatility. Our findings suggest that the breadth of information dissemination affects stock returns.

One puzzling feature of domestic private equity (PE) funds in emerging markets is that such funds often have a “short fuse”, i.e., a much shorter lifespan than their developed market counterparts. Based on a simple agency model, we propose an explanation for this puzzle. We show that, under a long fuse, PE managers have incentives to game performance-based compensation schemes by opportunistically timing investments and burning money when early investments fail. Shortening the fuse restricts timing opportunism, but alleviates money-burning incentives only if managerial compensation is sufficiently concavified or the contract stipulates substantial investors' hurdle returns. Both of these options can force managers to concede rents to investors. Thus, managers face a tradeoff between rents and agency costs. In emerging markets, where agency costs are high, managers use a short fuse with incentive compatible compensation schemes to minimize agency costs. In contrast, in developed markets, where agency costs are low, managers use a long fuse to preserve rents. Based on these results, we further draw predictions on fund performance, managerial behavior, and investor rents for both long-fused developed-market funds and short-fused emerging-market funds. We also predict that, when institutional infrastructure in emerging markets improves and when domestic PE managers in emerging markets gain more experience, domestic PE funds in emerging markets will adopt the long-lifespan PE contracts typical in developed markets.

[Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.]

This paper investigates the effect of management-level professional ties between suppliers and customers on the sustainability of business partnerships. We find that the presence of cross-firm professional ties between directors and senior executives along the supply chain significantly reduces the probability of relationship termination around customers’ industry negative shocks and during financial crises. The results are robust using professional-tie strength as an alternative measure. Exploring contingency effects, we find that, for suppliers who lack R&D, face high competition, are smaller in size, or are less important to customers in terms of sales, such professional ties are more helpful in sustaining such relationships. Furthermore, we find that professional ties also significantly reduce firm risk during periods of market turbulence. Taken together, our results suggest that professional ties along the supply chain can facilitate information flow and build mutual trust, which can lead to healthy long-term relationships and can help firms survive economic and industry downturns.

This study examines whether sell-side analysts can disseminate information consistent with anomaly prescriptions in China. I adopt 192 trading- and accounting-based anomaly signals to identify undervalued and overvalued stocks. Results show that analysts tend to make more (less) favorable recommendations and earnings forecasts for undervalued (overvalued) stocks. Regarding the information content, analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts are consistent with accounting- rather than trading-based information. Additionally, analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts are consistent with anomalies, especially for firms with a relatively poor information environment. These results indicate that Chinese analysts can mitigate anomaly mispricing and improve market efficiency.

This is the first systematic experimental study of the comparative performance of two incentive‐compatible mechanisms for public goods provision: the basic quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard and the paired‐difference mechanism by Walker. Our experiments demonstrate that the performance of the basic quadratic mechanism under a high punishment parameter is far better than that of the same mechanism under a low punishment parameter, which, in turn, is better than that of the paired‐difference mechanism. We estimate three individual behavioral models: an exponentialized relative payoff sum model outperforms the generalized fictitious play model. We also provide a sufficient condition for convergence under the basic quadratic mechanism.

What is the role of information intermediaries in corporate governance? This paper examines equity analysts’ influence on managers’ earnings management decisions. Do analysts serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? Using multiple measures of earnings management, I find that firms followed by more analysts manage their earnings less. To address the potential endogeneity problem of analyst coverage, I use two instrumental variables based on change in broker size and on firm's inclusion in the Standard & Poor's 500 index, and I find that the results are robust. Finally, given the number of covering analysts, analysts from top brokers and more experienced analysts have stronger effects against earnings management.

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we study how intellectual property right (IPR) protection affects innovation in China in the years around the privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Innovation increases after SOE privatizations, and this increase is larger in cities with strong IPR protection. Our results support theoretical arguments that IPR protection strengthens firms' incentives to innovate and that private sector firms are more sensitive to IPR protection than SOEs.