I study managerial short-termism in a dynamic model of project development with hidden effort and imperfect observability of quality. The manager can complete the project faster by reducing quality. To preempt this behavior, the prin cipal makes payments contingent on long-term outcomes. I analyze the dynamics of the optimal contract and its implications for the level of managerial turnover. I show that optimal contracts might be stationary and entail no termination. In general, I show that the principal reduces the manager’s temptation to behave myopically by reducing the likelihood of termination and deferring compensation. The model predicts a negative relation between the rate of managerial turnover and the use of deferred compensation that is consistent with evidence of managerial compensation contracts. Received May 23, 2016; editorial decision May 27, 2017 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

Abstract We show that the repurchaser–issuer return spread is stronger among stocks with high return volatility. Rational and behavioral theories predict that this finding is the product of risk volatility and sentiment volatility, respectively. However, our results are inconsistent with these theories as they currently stand. Loadings on standard risk factors do not follow the dynamics that would explain the return predictability related to issuance decisions. If we sort on a stock's beta with respect to the aggregate sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006, J. Finance, 61, 1645–1680), which proxies for sentiment volatility, the results are weaker—economically and statistically—than when sorting on return volatility.

Abstract This paper studies how a borrower issues long- and short-term debt in response to shocks to the fundamental value. Short-term debt protects creditors from future dilution and incentivizes the borrower to reduce leverage after small negative shocks. Long-term debt postpones default and allows the borrower time to recover after large negative shocks. When borrowers are in distress, they rely on short-term debt; however, they issue both types of debt during more normal periods. Our model generates novel implications for the dynamic adjustment of debt maturities.

Intermediaries reduce agency problems through monitoring, but credible monitoring requires sufficient retention until the loan matures. We study credit markets when intermediaries cannot commit to retention. Two structures are examined: investors lending alongside an all-equity bank and investors lending through the bank via short-term debt. With a commitment to retention, they are equivalent. Without commitment, the all-equity bank sells loans and reduces monitoring over time. Short-term debt encourages the intermediary to retain loans and incentivizes monitoring. Our analysis provides a novel mechanism for intermediaries’ reliance on short-term debt—the constant repricing of debt creates incentives that resolve the commitment problem in loan retention and monitoring.

ABSTRACT An entrepreneur borrows from a relationship bank or the market. The bank has a higher cost of capital but produces private information over time. While the entrepreneur accumulates reputation as the lending relationship continues, asymmetric information is also developed between the bank/entrepreneur and the market. In this setting, zombie lending is inevitable: Once the entrepreneur becomes sufficiently reputable, the bank will roll over loans even after learning bad news, for the prospect of future market financing. Zombie lending is mitigated when the entrepreneur faces financial constraints. Finally, the bank stops producing information too early if information production is costly.

ABSTRACT This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's incentives vest over time at an increasing rate, and compensation becomes very sensitive to short‐term performance. This generates an endogenous horizon problem whereby managers intensify performance manipulation in their final years in office. Contracts are designed to encourage effort while minimizing the adverse effects of manipulation. We characterize the optimal mix of short‐ and long‐term compensation along the manager's tenure, the optimal vesting period of incentive pay, and the dynamics of short‐termism over the CEO's tenure.

Abstract We study the design of monitoring in dynamic settings with moral hazard. An agent (e.g. a firm) benefits from reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent’s quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent’s reputation, and an informational role because the principal directly values the information. We characterize the optimal monitoring policy inducing full effort. When information is the principal’s main concern, optimal monitoring is deterministic with periodic reviews. When incentive provision is the main concern, optimal monitoring is random with a constant hazard rate.

ABSTRACT This paper studies the reliability of financial reporting when the credibility of the manager, represented by his misreporting propensity, is unknown. We show that credibility concerns affect the time-series of reported earnings, book values, and stock prices in ways that seem consistent with empirical evidence. When investors are uncertain about the credibility of the reporting process, earnings response coefficients, as well as market-to-book values (MTB), are random and time-varying; relatively low MTB reflect poor credibility of financial reporting; stock prices are s-shaped in earnings surprises and relatively insensitive to bad news. Finally, when the manager is more likely to have reporting discretion, discretionary accruals tend to be larger and more volatile. We estimate the model using U.S. earnings announcement data during 2002–2012 and find that the probability of misreporting is 7 percent. A counterfactual analysis reveals that ignoring the possibility of misreporting leads to overestimation of the mean (3.5 percent), volatility (13 percent), and persistence of earnings (17 percent). JEL Classifications: D82; D83; D84.

Firm managers likely have more information than outsiders. If managers strategically conceal information, market uncertainty will increase. We develop a dynamic corporate disclosure model, estimating the model using the management earnings forecasts of US public companies. The model, based on the buildup of reputations by managers over time, matches key facts about forecast dynamics. We find that 80% of firms strategically manage information, that managers have superior information around half of the time, and that firms conceal information about 40% of the time. Concealment increases market uncertainty by just under 8%, a sizable information loss.