Journal of Accounting Research200745(4), 771-810open access
ABSTRACT We examine stock price reaction to voluntary disclosure of innovation strategy by high‐tech firms and its relation with insider stock transactions before the disclosure. We find that, despite the qualitative and subjective nature of strategy‐related disclosure, there is positive stock price reaction to the disclosure. The evidence suggests that investors view the disclosure as credible good news. We also find that the disclosure is associated with more positive stock price reaction when it is preceded by insider purchase transactions. This evidence is consistent with insider purchase enhancing the credibility of the disclosure. The credibility‐enhancing effect is found to be stronger for firms with higher degrees of information asymmetry (younger firms, firms with lower analyst following, loss firms, and firms with higher research and development (R&D) intensity). Our evidence also indicates that predisclosure insider purchase is associated with greater future abnormal returns, suggesting that managers are privy to good news shortly before the disclosure.
Review of Accounting Studies202328(3), 1141-1189open access
Abstract We examine the value relevance of accounting-driven losses that result from the immediate expensing of firms’ internally generated intangible investments versus losses occurring irrespective of intangible investments. Contrary to the long-held view that losses are less relevant than profits for valuation, we find that once the accounting bias of intangibles-expensing is undone, earnings of firms reporting intangibles-driven losses are as informative as earnings of profitable firms. Furthermore, contrary to the view that persistent losses decrease earnings relevance, our evidence shows no decrease in the relevance of earnings for firms reporting persistent intangibles-driven losses. We also find that firms reporting intangibles-driven losses subsequently outperform other loss firms and even profitable firms in value creation from investments in technological innovation and human capital. Our evidence further shows that firms reporting intangibles-driven losses have stronger future performance than other firms. Taken together, the results of this study demonstrate the fundamental differences between losses driven by the immediate expensing of internally generated intangible investments and losses reflecting genuine business performance shortfalls. Standard accounting performance measures, however, do not properly reflect these operational differences and their implications.
ABSTRACT We establish that the root cause of many goodwill write-offs is the buyers' overpriced shares at acquisition. Overpriced shares provide managers with strong incentives to exploit the overpricing by acquiring businesses, often paying more than the acquisition's synergies, setting the stage for subsequent goodwill write-offs. In particular, we document the following patterns: (1) Share overpricing is strongly and positively associated with the intensity of corporate acquisitions and the growth of accounting goodwill. (2) Share overpricing predicts goodwill write-offs and their magnitude. (3) Acquisitions by overpriced companies—a strategy often recommended by investment bankers and some academics—are often ill-advised (overpaid for and/or strategic misfit), exacerbating the post-acquisition negative returns of buyers beyond the reversal of the overpricing. Thus, managers' arguments notwithstanding, goodwill write-off is an important event highlighting a dysfunctional investment strategy. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis202055(3), 931-954
We examine investors’ preference for directors serving on fewer versus more boards (“busy directors”) by measuring market reaction to busy directors’ resignations at the companies that still keep these directors on the board. We find a positive reaction implying a preference for fewer directorships. The reaction is more positive when the need for the director’s services is greater, when the resignation frees up more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality. Furthermore, we find that following their resignation, directors increase their board responsibilities/leadership at firms that still retain them and seek no board appointments elsewhere.