In this paper, I examine a new approach for measuring earnings quality, defined as the closeness of reported earnings to “permanent earnings,” based on firm decisions with regard to capital and labor investments. Specifically, I measure earnings quality as the contemporaneous association between changes in the levels of capital and labor investment and the change in reported earnings. This approach follows the reasoning that (1) firms make investment decisions based on the net present value (NPV) of investment projects and (2) reported earnings with higher quality should more closely associate with real investment decisions. I find that measures of earnings quality based on managerial labor and capital decisions correlate positively with earnings persistence and have incremental explanatory power relative to earnings-quality measures used in the accounting literature. Furthermore, investment-based earnings-quality measures are less informative when managers tend to overinvest.

This paper examines the relation between annual report readability and firm performance and earnings persistence. I measure the readability of public company annual reports using the Fog index from the computational linguistics literature and the length of the document. I find that: (1) the annual reports of firms with lower earnings are harder to read (i.e., they have a higher Fog index and are longer); and (2) firms with annual reports that are easier to read have more persistent positive earnings.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the information content of the forward‐looking statements (FLS) in the Management Discussion and Analysis section (MD&A) of 10‐K and 10‐Q filings using a Naïve Bayesian machine learning algorithm. I find that firms with better current performance, lower accruals, smaller size, lower market‐to‐book ratio, less return volatility, lower MD&A Fog index, and longer history tend to have more positive FLSs. The average tone of the FLS is positively associated with future earnings even after controlling for other determinants of future performance. The results also show that, despite increased regulations aimed at strengthening MD&A disclosures, there is no systematic change in the information content of MD&As over time. In addition, the tone in MD&As seems to mitigate the mispricing of accruals. When managers “warn” about the future performance implications of accruals (i.e., the MD&A tone is positive (negative) when accruals are negative (positive)), accruals are not associated with future returns. The tone measures based on three commonly used dictionaries (Diction, General Inquirer, and the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) do not positively predict future performance. This result suggests that these dictionaries might not work well for analyzing corporate filings.

ABSTRACT We investigate the use of a warrant‐pricing approach to incorporate employee stock options (ESOs) into equity valuation and to account for the dilutive effect of ESOs in the valuation of option grants for financial reporting purposes. Our valuation approach accounts for the jointly determined nature of ESO and shareholder values. The empirical results show that our stock price estimate exhibits lower prediction errors and higher explanatory powers for actual share price than does the traditional stock price estimate. We use our valuation approach to assess the implications of dilution on the fair‐value estimates of ESO grants. We find that the fair value is overstated by 6% if we ignore the dilutive feature of ESOs. Furthermore, this bias is larger for firms that are heavy users of ESOs, small, and R&D intensive, and for firms that have a broad‐based ESO compensation plan.

ABSTRACT We examine whether auditors exercise professional skepticism about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions. Using publicly issued management earnings forecasts as a proxy for earnings forecasts provided by managers to auditors, we find that management earnings forecasts are negatively associated with both auditors’ going‐concern opinions and subsequent bankruptcy. The weight auditors put on management forecasts in the going‐concern decision is not significantly different from the weight implied in the bankruptcy prediction model. Moreover, compared with the bankruptcy model, auditors assign a lower weight to management forecasts they perceive as being less credible, including those (1) issued by managers who issued optimistic forecasts in the previous two years, and (2) predicting high earnings increases or high earnings. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with auditors being professionally skeptical about management earnings forecasts when making going‐concern decisions.

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.

Abstract We examine a simple measure of operating leverage: the ratio of fixed costs (measured by depreciation and amortization plus selling, general, and administrative expenses) to the market (or book) value of assets. We find that this measure of operating leverage positively predicts returns. This operating leverage measure is not explained by common factors and performs better than the traditional measures of operating leverage. Furthermore, an exploratory two-factor model with the operating leverage factor works at least as well as, but does not subsume, the Fama and French five-factor model. (JEL G11, G12, G30)

We examine the relation between internal control quality and the accuracy of management guidance. Consistent with managers in firms with ineffective internal controls relying on erroneous internal management reports when forming guidance, we document less accurate guidance among firms reporting ineffective internal controls. This relation extends to a change analysis, and the impact of ineffective internal controls on forecast accuracy is three times larger when the weakness relates to revenues or cost of goods sold—inputs particularly relevant to forecasting earnings. We conclude that internal control quality has an economically significant effect on internal management reports and thus decisions based on these figures.

ABSTRACT In this paper we develop a measure of competition based on management's disclosures in their 10‐K filing and find that firms’ rates of diminishing marginal returns on new and existing investment vary significantly with our measure. We show that these firm‐level disclosures are related to existing industry‐level measures of disclosure (e.g., Herfindahl index), but capture something distinctly new. In particular, we show that the measure has both across‐industry variation and within‐industry variation, and each is related to the firm's future rates of diminishing marginal returns. As such, our measure is a useful complement to existing measures of competition. We present a battery of specification tests designed to explore the boundaries of our measure and how it varies with the definition of industry and the presence of other measures of competition.