Building Better Information: Reporting Technology, Internal Information Frictions, and Investment Efficiency
We assess how firms use spending on reporting infrastructure to improve managerial reporting quality (MRQ) and whether doing so improves investment efficiency. Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s internal control provisions (SOX 404) as a shock to MRQ demand, we find that treated firms increase reporting infrastructure spending, including for information technology and communications. We next examine variation across segments in the benefits and costs of improving reporting infrastructure. Segments increase spending more when facing larger internal moral hazard frictions and when they are less likely to have voluntarily improved MRQ before SOX (including segments insulated from competition, facing difficulty obtaining enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, or lacking internal control personnel). Finally, we find that treated firms improve investment efficiency post-SOX 404, with larger gains among firms with higher spending on reporting infrastructure. Our findings indicate that regulatory mandates can improve investment efficiency by inducing reporting infrastructure improvements that enhance MRQ.