The market for the credit ratings of Chinese firms is large and growing. We analyse Chinese firms that have ratings from both domestic and global agencies. Despite the similar symbols, the rating scales of the domestic and global agencies clearly differ – as any single company's global agency and domestic agency ratings differ by 6–7 notches on average. Focusing on the comparable rank ordering of domestic and global credit ratings, we test general hypotheses about the impact of the ratings industry structure on ratings outcomes. While potential ownership-related conflicts of interest and growth of the business are not consistently associated with higher ratings, ratings industry competition is related to inflated ratings. There is also weak evidence that the downgrade of the Chinese sovereign rating by foreign rating agencies has impacted the global ratings of corporations, particularly when they are state owned. While factors relating to rating industry structure do not significantly impact bond yields, both domestic and global ratings are significant factors in yield spread multivariate regressions, and thus appear to add value beyond financial variables.

This paper investigates the spillover effects of money market turbulence in 2007–08 on the short-term covered interest parity (CIP) condition between the US dollar and the euro through the foreign exchange (FX) swap market. Sharp and persistent deviations from the CIP condition observed during the turmoil are found to be significantly associated with differences in the counterparty risk between European and US financial institutions. Furthermore, evidence is found that US dollar term funding auctions by the ECB, supported by US dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve, alleviated the level of dislocations, as well as the instability, of the FX swap market.

Many regulations use private sector credit ratings to determine investment prohibitions and capital requirements for institutional portfolio investments. These regulations implicitly assume that different agencies have equivalent rating scales, despite the fact that some agencies assign systematically higher ratings than others. We assess the appropriateness of these regulatory practices by testing whether observed rating differences reflect different rating scales or simply result from sample selection bias. Our analysis reveals only limited evidence of selection bias. We also ask what types of firms of firms are most likely to seek ratings from the agencies with higher rating scales. Our analysis uncovers no evidence that firms seek ratings from these agencies to clear specific regulatory hurdles or to reduce ex ante uncertainty about default risk.

Why do private firms stay private? Empirical evidence on this issue is sparse, as most private firms in the U.S. do not report their financial results. We investigate why private status matters by taking advantage of a unique dataset of large, leveraged private firms with SEC filings. Unlike a number of other studies, we find that neither the existence of growth opportunities, nor the desire of firm founders to diversify, is a principal determinant of the decision whether or not to retain private status. Rather, the existence of private benefits of control appears to serve as the most significant incentive to stay private. Family-controlled firms have significantly lower probabilities of filing for an IPO, while a board structure that grants management relatively more autonomy lowers the probability of an IPO filing as well. Cross-sectional analysis of profitability and ex post performance suggests that while private benefits of control may encourage firms to stay private, they do not have detrimental effects on firm efficiency. In contrast, firms controlled by private equity specialists appear to place a low value on control benefits and are likely to go public as a means of cashing out.

This paper investigates close bank–firm relations (keiretsu) among troubled Japanese firms by examining the type of bankruptcy. In Japan, creditors control the fate of the bankrupt firm, which may be costly if managers destroy firm value to avoid bankruptcy or, alternatively, if creditors liquidate too often. Recently, researchers have argued that keiretsu banks prop up weak firms that should fail. We find that bankrupt firms affiliated with keiretsu banks are neither subject to excessive liquidation by overly powerful banks nor slower to be liquidated. Keiretsu banks liquidate via the courts often, perhaps to avoid political repercussions and organized crime.

Do banks price the risks of climate policy change? Combining syndicated loan data with carbon intensity data (CO2 emissions relative to revenue) of borrowers across a wide range of industries, we find a significant “carbon premium” since the Paris Agreement. The loan risk premium related to CO2 emission intensity is apparent across industries and broader than that due simply to “stranded assets” in fossil fuel or other carbon-intensive industries. The price of risk, however, appears to be relatively low given the material risks faced by some borrowers. Only carbon emissions directly caused by the firm (scope 1) are priced, and not the overall carbon footprint including indirect emissions. “Green” banks do not appear to price carbon risk differently from other banks.