This paper examines trends in union membership during the twentieth century. The hypothesis is advanced that the provision of certain social welfare benefits by government substitutes for the private provision by unions, thereby reducing the attractiveness of union membership. The empirical implications of this hypothesis are examined using time-series data on aggregate union membership for the period 1904-80 and using pooled state data for the period 1964-80. These latter data are used to examine the effect of departures from the traditional doctrine of "employment at will." Both the time-series and the cross-section evidence suggest that government supply of "union-like" services reduces union membership.

Analyses of strike behavior rarely take account of prior learning and experience of bargainers. We show that experienced bargainers have fewer strikes than others and that differences in strike activity across U.S. manufacturing industries vary inversely with the estimated cost of striking. The cost of striking is measured as an inverse function of the ease of substituting pre- and poststrike production for strike-inhibited output. The occurrence of strikes, among rational and experienced bargainers, is attributed to the cost of designing contingent contracts applicable to unlikely circumstances, relative to the expected cost of strikes in such circumstances, absent contingent contracts.

Analyses of strike behavior rarely take account of prior learning and experience of bargainers. We show that experienced bargainers have fewer strikes than others and that differences in strike activity across U.S. manufacturing industries vary inversely with the estimated cost of striking. The cost of striking is measured as an inverse function of the ease of substituting pre- and poststrike production for strike-inhibited output. The occurrence of strikes, among rational and experienced bargainers, is attributed to the cost of designing contingent contracts applicable to unlikely circumstances, relative to the expected cost of strikes in such circumstances, absent contingent contracts.

This paper provides an empirically tractable version of a job-search model. The model is estimated using data on a sample of workers who were laid off when their plants closed. A generalization of the empirical model which allows for reservation wages to change over duration of unemployment is provided and estimated. Reservation wages are found to decline significantly with duration. Applications of the model and the estimates to explain diverse labor market phenomena are provided.

Results from the Iowa Political Stock Market are analyzed to ascertain how well markets work as aggregators of information. We find that the market worked extremely well, dominating opinion polls in forecasting the outcome of the 1988 presidential election, even though traders in the market exhibited substantial amounts of judgment biases. Our explanation is that judgment bias refers to average behavior, while in markets it is marginal traders who influence price. We present evidence that in this market a sufficient number of traders were free of judgment bias so that the market was able to work well.

[This paper extends the empirical version of a job-search model to permit heterogeneity in the location of wage offer distributions. Population variance in wage offers is decomposed into variance due to heterogeneity and variance facing each individual. Heterogeneity is found to be an important source of offer variance in the population. The amount of "pure wage offer dispersion" facing individuals is found to contribute little to population variance.]

This paper provides an empirically tractable version of a job-search model. The model is estimated using data on a sample of workers who were laid off when their plants closed. A generalization of the empirical model which allows for reservation wages to change over duration of unemployment is provided and estimated. Reservation wages are found to decline significantly with duration. Applications of the model and the estimates to explain diverse labor market phenomena are provided.

Jon P. Nelson, George R. Neumann, Ronald M. Crandall, A Comparison of Alternative Econometric Models of Iron and Steel Investment Behavior, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 122-127

Results from the Iowa Political Stock Market are analyzed to ascertain how well markets work as aggregators of information. The authors find that the market worked extremely well, dominating opinion polls in forecasting the outcome of the 1988 presidential election, even though traders in the market exhibited substantial amounts of judgment biases. Their explanation is that judgment bias refers to average behavior, while in markets it is marginal traders who influence price. They present evidence that in this market a sufficient number of traders were free of judgment bias so that the market was able to work well. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.

The article structually estimates an on‐the‐job search model of job separations. Given each employer pays observably equivalent workers the same but wages are dispersed across employers, an employer's separation flow is the sum of an exogenous outflow unrelated to the wage and a job‐to‐job flow that decreases with the employer's wage. Using data from the Danish Integrated Database for Labour Market Research, the empirical results imply, as predicted by theory, that search effort declines with the wage. Furthermore, the estimates explain the employment effect, defined as the horizontal difference between the distribution of wages earned and the wage offer distribution.