Les procédures analytiques procurent aux auditeurs un mécanisme d’évaluation de la « vraisemblance » des informations financières, grâce à la comparaison de la performance présentée par l’entité cliente et des attentes découlant de leur connaissance de l’entité cliente, fondée sur l’expérience passée et l’évolution de l’organisation et de son secteur d’activité. Les procédures analytiques diffèrent donc foncièrement des autres procédures d’audit, du fait que la performance de l’entité est envisagée dans une perspective plus large, dans le contexte de son environnement. Cela explique que les procédures analytiques se soient révélées efficientes dans le dépistage des anomalies, et nombreux sont ceux qui affirment que plusieurs des fraudes financières passées auraient été décelées si les auditeurs avaient mis en œuvre des procédures analytiques efficaces. Compte tenu de l’ampleur et de la portée des progrès réalisés au cours de la dernière décennie, les auteurs se demandent si les procédures analytiques ont changé au fil de ces années et, le cas échéant, comment ces changements se sont manifestés. Ils s’intéressent en particulier à l’incidence de « facilitateurs » et d’« inducteurs » de changement importants, comme les progrès technologiques et l’adoption de la loi Sarbanes‐Oxley. Ils comparent également leurs observations aux résultats d’une étude marquante sur les méthodes utilisées dans la mise en œuvre des procédures analytiques, réalisée par Hirst et Koonce (1996) il y a plus de 10 ans. Les auteurs interrogent en entrevue 36 auditeurs (11 chargés de missions, 13 chefs de groupe et 12 associés) provenant tous des Quatre Grands cabinets d’expertise comptable, à l’aide d’un questionnaire structuré. Les données recueillies révèlent certaines similitudes dans les observations lorsqu’elles sont comparées aux résultats des études antérieures (par exemple, les auditeurs continuent d’utiliser des procédures analytiques relativement simples). Toutefois, les auteurs relèvent bon nombre de différences sensibles attestant de l’évolution des méthodes utilisées dans la mise en œuvre des procédures analytiques. Ainsi, par suite des progrès de la technologie, les auditeurs s’appuient maintenant plus largement qu’ils ne le faisaient auparavant sur les données sectorielles et les données des analystes. En outre, les auditeurs disent élaborer des prévisions quantitatives plus précises et utiliser davantage d’informations non financières. Ils semblent également confier plus fréquemment la mise en œuvre des procédures analytiques au personnel d’audit d’échelon inférieur, prennent une quantité plus grande d’informations auprès du personnel non comptable et sont disposés à réduire davantage les tests de corroboration, compte tenu des procédures analytiques mises en œuvre à la phase de planification. Enfin, la loi Sarbanes‐Oxley a favorisé l’augmentation de la prise en compte et de la connaissance des contrôles internes, facteur que l’on estime avoir joué le rôle le plus important dans la recrudescence de l’utilisation des procédures analytiques et le renforcement de la confiance accordée à ce type de procédures.

Analytical Procedures (APs) provide a means for auditors to evaluate the “reasonableness” of financial disclosures by comparing a client’s reported performance to expectations gained through knowledge of the client based on past experience and developments within the company and its industry. Thus, APs are fundamentally different than other audit tests in taking a broader perspective of an entity’s performance vis‐à‐vis its environment. As such, APs have been found to be a cost‐effective means to detect misstatements, and many have argued that a number of prior financial frauds would have been detected had auditors employed effective APs. With several dramatic and far‐reaching developments over the past decade, the current study examines whether and how APs have changed during this period. In particular, we focus on the impact of significant “enablers” and “drivers” of change such as technological advancements and the enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act. We also compare our findings to an influential study of the practices of APs by Hirst and Koonce (1996) that was conducted over 10 years ago. We interview 36 auditors (11 seniors, 13 managers, and 12 partners) from all of the Big 4 firms using a structured questionnaire. The data reveal some similarities in findings when compared to prior research (e.g., auditors continue to use fairly simple analytical procedures). However, there are a number of significant differences reflecting changes in AP practices. For instance, as a result of technology auditors now rely more extensively on industry and analyst data than previously. Further, auditors report that they develop more precise quantitative expectations and use more non‐financial information. They also appear to rely more on lower level audit staff to perform APs, conduct greater inquiry of non‐accounting personnel, and are willing to reduce substantive testing to a greater extent as a result of APs conducted in the planning phase. Finally, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act has had an impact in greater consideration and knowledge of internal controls, which is seen as the most important factor driving the use and reliance on APs.

Analytical Procedures (APs) provide a means for auditors to evaluate the reasonableness of financial disclosures by comparing a clients reported performance to expectations gained through knowledge of the client based on past experience and developments within the company and its industry. Thus, APs are fundamentally different than other audit tests in taking a broader perspective of an entitys performance vis-a-vis its environment. As such, APs have been found to be a cost-effective means to detect misstatements, and many have argued that a number of prior financial frauds would have been detected had auditors employed effective APs. With several dramatic and far-reaching developments over the past decade, the current study examines whether and how APs have changed during this period. In particular, we focus on the impact of significant enablers and drivers of change such as technological advancements and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We also compare our findings to an influential study of the practices of APs by Hirst and Koonce (1996) that was conducted over 10 years ago. We interview 36 auditors (11 seniors, 13 managers, and 12 partners) from all of the Big 4 firms using a structured questionnaire. The data reveal some similarities in findings when compared to prior research (e.g., auditors continue to use fairly simple analytical procedures). However, there are a number of significant differences reflecting changes in AP practices. For instance, as a result of technology auditors now rely more extensively on industry and analyst data than previously. Further, auditors report that they develop more precise quantitative expectations and use more nonfinancial information. They also appear to rely more on lower level audit staff to perform APs, conduct greater inquiry of non-accounting personnel, and are willing to reduce substantive testing to a greater extent as a result of APs conducted in the planning phase. Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had an impact in greater consideration and knowledge of internal controls, which is seen as the most important factor driving the use and reliance on APs. © 2010 CAAA.

Abstract. This article investigates the relationship between supplier concentration and competition in the market for audit services. The study is motivated by the concern that high levels of concentration may be detrimental, resulting in lower levels of competition, which could harm clients through higher fees and lower levels of service. However, a counterargument is that high levels of concentration may not be detrimental but may result because market leaders display exceptional performance, providing lower‐priced audits (perhaps due to economies of scale) and/or enhanced service to clients. We obtained audit fee and financial data on 140 life and health insurance companies and 101 property and casualty insurance companies. Our findings indicate that concentration is negatively associated with fees, suggesting that higher levels of concentration are related to higher levels of price competition (i.e., lower fees). Additionally, we address the validity of concentration as a surrogate for competition by examining competition among the market leaders. Our analysis examines the fees paid by 47 insurance companies that switched auditors during the sample period. We investigate the effect of industry specialization on fees paid by clients that switch auditors, finding evidence of significant fee cutting among market leaders for each others' clients but no evidence of fee reductions for clients switching from nonleaders to market leaders. This is consistent with the claim that there is significant price competition for clients among the market leaders, suggesting that high concentration need not result in low levels of price competition (i.e., higher fees). Résumé. Les auteurs analysent la relation entre la concentration des fournisseurs et la coocurrence sur le marché des services de vérification. L'étude découle de la préoccupation suivant laquelle des niveaux élevés de concentration pourraient être préjudiciables et donner lieu à une intensité plus faible de la concurrence qui risquerait de léser les clients, en augmentant les honoraires et en diminuant la qualité du service. L'argumentation opposée veut qu'un degré élevé de concentration ne soit pas préjudiciable et puisse être attribuable au fait que les chefs de file du marché affichent une performance exceptionnelle, offrant des services de vérification à meilleur prix (peut‐être en raison d'économies d'échelle) et (ou) mettent l'accent sur le service à la clientèle. Les auteurs ont recueilli des données relatives aux honoraires de vérification et des données financières provenant de 140 sociétés d'assurances vie et maladie et 101 sociétés d'assurances I.A.R.D. (incendie, accidents et risques divers). Les résultats de leurs recherches indiquent que la concentration est en relation négative avec les honoraires, ce qui donne à penser que des niveaux plus élevés de concentration sont reliés à des niveaux plus élevés de concurrence relative au prix (c'est‐à‐dire à des honoraires inférieurs). Les auteurs se sont également penchés sur la validité de la concentration à titre de substitut à la concurrence en examinant la concurrence que se livraient les chefs de file sur le marché. Ils ont analysé les honoraires versés par 47 sociétés d'assurance qui ont changé de vérificateurs au cours de la période analysée. Us ont étudié l'incidence de la spécialisation sectorielle sur les honoraires versés par les clients qui changent de vérificateurs; les résultats de l'étude démontrent que les cabinets chefs de file réduisent leurs honoraires de façon appréciable à l'intention des clients de leurs concurrents appartenant au groupe des chefs de file; ces résultats ne permettent cependant pas de conclure à des réductions d'honoraires pour les clients qui passent de vérificateurs n'appartenant pas aux chefs de file à des vérificateurs chefs de file sur le marché. Ces constatations sont conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les chefs de file sur le marché se livrent une âpre concurrence relative au prix pour attirer la clientèle, ce qui laisse croire que la concentration élevée ne donne pas nécessairement lieu à une faible intensité de la concurrence relative au prix (c'est‐à‐dire à des honoraires supérieurs).

[In this article, we use audit-hour and billing-rate data supplied by a large public accounting firm to address the question, "Does providing audit clients with nonaudit services result in knowledge spillovers and audit production efficiencies that could produce economic rents for the auditor?" In prior analytical work, both Simunic (1984) and Beck et al. (1988) have argued that knowledge acquired while providing nonaudit services may "spill over" to the production of the audit, and thus generate production efficiencies. If audit production efficiencies lead to cost savings that are retained in whole or in part by the auditor (rather than passed on to the client), then economic rents accrue to the auditor, creating incentives for the auditor to resolve disputes in the client's favor. Although several past studies suggest that the joint provision of audit and nonaudit services may give rise to knowledge spillovers that could lead to economic rents (Palmrose 1986; Simon 1985; Simunic 1984; Turpen 1990), they do not provide direct evidence that spillovers or rents exist, and the empirical results are mixed. For example, Abdel-khalik (1990, 320) reports that he was unable to detect interdependencies between audit and nonaudit fees, a direct contrast to the findings of Simunic and Palmrose. Further, Palmrose reports a positive relation between audit fees and the nonaudit fees paid to nonincumbent firms, a finding that weakens the argument for knowledge spillovers. Thus, as Solomon (1990, 328) points out, "... the impact of MAS (management advisory services) on audit pricing as well as who (i.e., the client or the auditor) benefits from knowledge spillovers (if they exist) remains an open and interesting question." Our empirical analysis consists of three steps. First, we demonstrate the comparability of our sample to those in prior studies by fitting prior researchers' models to our data and replicating a finding Simunic (1984) interpreted as evidence of knowledge spillovers: a positive relation between audit and nonaudit fees. Second, we use a unique data set compiled from the participating firm's internal billing records, working papers, and audit planning memos to test for a positive relation between nonaudit services and audit effort. This test is motivated by Palmrose's (1986, 410) speculation that the higher audit fees paid by clients who also purchase nonaudit services may be driven by additional audit effort. We regress audit effort on nonaudit service fees (and Palmrose's control variables), partitioning nonaudit fees into three types: tax, accounting, and other. We use three measures of audit effort: unweighted audit hours, audit hours weighted by billing rate ratios, and audit hours weighted by billing rates. We find a weakly significant, positive relation between tax services and all three audit effort measures and between accounting-related consulting services and audit hours weighted by billing-rate ratios, which suggests that additonal effort is required for audits of clients who also purchase nonaudit services. With the assumption that the demand for auditing is inelastic (Beck et al. 1988, 52-54), these results do not support the existence of audit production efficiencies from knowledge spillovers. Third, we test whether there is a positive relation between audit fees for a given level of audit effort and each of our three types of nonaudit service fees. This test is motivated by the possibility that, if the demand for auditing is elastic (Simunic 1984, 698), the observed increase in audit fees and effort could be driven by demand for more auditing by purchasers of nonaudit services (e.g., in substitution for internal control) as the result of auditors passing on cost savings from knowledge spillovers. If auditors are able to retain some of the cost savings, and thereby earn economic rents in the form of higher fees for a given level of audit effort, then our results should reveal a significant, positive relation between nonaudit and audit fees. However, we do not find a significant relation when we control for direct measures of audit effort that were not available to prior researchers. These results suggest that, although purchasers of nonaudit services pay higher audit fees than nonpurchasers, the higher fees are associated with a proportional increase in audit effort, measured in this study as unweighted and weighted audit hours. These findings are inconsistent with one interpretation of prior research: that performing nonaudit services for audit clients may provide the auditor with incentives to compromise objectivity.]

ABSTRACT We examine how compensation policies of audit firms are associated with audit quality. Specifically, we investigate the effects of the ratio of variable to fixed compensation and the size of the basis for profit sharing (i.e., whether partners share profits in a small or in a large profit pool). For our analyses, we use detailed mandatory disclosure of the compensation policies in German audit firms. We document that compensation policies vary considerably across audit firms. We find that profit sharing in a small profit pool and high variable compensation are two characteristics of auditor compensation associated with lower audit quality. We also find some evidence suggesting that audit quality may be most at risk in cases in which partners rely more heavily on variable compensation to divide a relatively small profit pool. In additional analyses, we find that these associations are more pronounced in medium‐sized audit firms. We argue that this finding may result from these firms being too large for audit partners to directly monitor each other effectively, yet simultaneously too small to have sophisticated centralized monitoring systems in place. Finally, we find that integrating partner‐specific, nonprofit‐related performance metrics into the compensation structure mitigates the adverse effects of small profit pools and high variable compensation.

ABSTRACT The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.