Volatility in equity markets is asymmetric: contemporaneous return and conditional return volatility are negatively correlated. In this article I develop an asymmetric volatility model where dividend growth and dividend volatility are the two state variables of the economy. The model allows both the leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect, the two popular explanations of asymmetry. The model is estimated by the simulated method of moments. I find that both the leverage effect and volatility feedback are important determinants of asymmetric volatility, and volatility feedback is significant both statistically and economically.

It appears that volatility in equity markets is asymmetric: returns and conditional volatility are negatively correlated. We provide a unified framework to simultaneously investigate asymmetric volatility at the firm and the market level and to examine two potential explanations of the asymmetry: leverage effects and volatility feedback. Our empirical application uses the market portfolio and portfolios with different leverage constructed from Nikkei 225 stocks. We reject the pure leverage model of Christie (1982) and find support for a volatility feedback story. Volatility feedback at the firm level is enhanced by strong asymmetries in conditional covariances. Conditional betas do not show significant asymmetries. We document the risk premium implications of these findings.

We construct an index of firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of an investment Euler equation. Unlike the commonly used KZ index, ours is consistent with firm characteristics associated with external finance constraints. Constrained firms' returns move together, suggesting the existence of a financial constraints factor. This factor earns a positive but insignificant average return. Much of the variation in this factor cannot be explained by the Fama-French and momentum factors. Cross-sectional regressions of returns on our index and other firm characteristics show that constrained firms earn higher returns and that the financial-constraints effect dominates the size effect.

Volatility in equity markets is asymmetric: contemporaneous return and conditional return volatility are negatively correlated. In this article I develop an asymmetric volatility model where dividend growth and dividend volatility are the two state variables of the economy. The model allows both the leverage effect and the volatility feedback effect, the two popular explanations of asymmetry. The model is estimated by the simulated method of moments. I find that both the leverage effect and volatility feedback are important determinants of asymmetric volatility, and volatility feedback is significant both statistically and economically.

[Using a novel information asymmetry index based on measures of adverse selection developed by the market microstructure literature, we test whether information asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions, as suggested by the pecking order theory. Our index relies exclusively on measures of the market's assessment of adverse selection risk rather than on ex ante firm characteristics. We find that information asymmetry does affect the capital structure decisions of U. S. firms over the sample period 1973-2002. Our findings are robust to controlling for conventional leverage factors (size, tangibility, Q ratio, profitability), the sources of firms' financing needs, and such firm attributes as stock return volatility, stock turnover, and intensity of insider trading. For example, we estimate that on average, for every dollar of financing deficit to cover, firms in the highest adverse selection decile issue 30 cents of debt more than firms in the lowest decile. Overall, this evidence explains why the pecking order theory is only partially successful in explaining all of firms' capital structure decisions. It also suggests that the theory finds support when its basic assumptions hold in the data, as should reasonably be expected of any theory.]

It appears that volatility in equity markets is asymmetric: returns and conditional volatility are negatively correlated. We provide a unified framework to simultaneously investigate asymmetric volatility at the firm and the market level and to examine two potential explanations of the asymmetry: leverage effects and time-varying risk premiums. Our empirical application uses the market portfolio and portfolios with different leverage constructed from Nikkei 225 stocks, extending the empirical evidence on asymmetry to Japanese stocks. Although volatility asymmetry is present and significant at the market and the portfolio levels, its source differs across portfolios. We find that it is important to include leverage ratios in the volatility dynamics but that their economic effects are mostly dwarfed by the volatility feedback mechanism. Volatility feedback is enhanced by a phenomenon that we term covariance asymmetry: conditional covariances with the market increase only significantly following negative market news. We do not find significant asymmetries in conditional betas.

We construct an index of firms' external finance constraints via generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of an investment Euler equation. Unlike the commonly used KZ index, ours is consistent with firm characteristics associated with external finance constraints. Constrained firms' returns move together, suggesting the existence of a financial constraints factor. This factor earns a positive but insignificant average return. Much of the variation in this factor cannot be explained by the Fama--French and momentum factors. Cross-sectional regressions of returns on our index and other firm characteristics show that constrained firms earn higher returns and that the financial-constraints effect dominates the size effect.

Using a novel information asymmetry index based on measures of adverse selection developed by the market microstructure literature, we test whether information asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions, as suggested by the pecking order theory. Our index relies exclusively on measures of the market's assessment of adverse selection risk rather than on ex ante firm characteristics. We find that information asymmetry does affect the capital structure decisions of U.S. firms over the sample period 1973--2002. Our findings are robust to controlling for conventional leverage factors (size, tangibility, Q ratio, profitability), the sources of firms' financing needs, and such firm attributes as stock return volatility, stock turnover, and intensity of insider trading. For example, we estimate that on average, for every dollar of financing deficit to cover, firms in the highest adverse selection decile issue 30 cents of debt more than firms in the lowest decile. Overall, this evidence explains why the pecking order theory is only partially successful in explaining all of firms' capital structure decisions. It also suggests that the theory finds support when its basic assumptions hold in the data, as should reasonably be expected of any theory. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.