This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers. In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage. This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets. The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena. It provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates. It also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces. Finally, the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment.

This paper integrates the labor and assets markets equilibria to determine and evaluate the wage differentials generated for cyclical and noncyclical risks of unemployment. The relative wage differential is a linear function of unemployment risk measured by the covariance of an index of employment with the rate of change in aggregate output. Seniority and the hoarding of skilled labor are characteristics of minimum cost contracts because employees with more human capital prefer safer jobs. Empirical results suggest that a 14%-41% wage differential can be explained by interindustry differences in unemployment risks.

This paper examines the provision of industrial safety in a competitive labor market under the assumption that it takes time for workers to learn about changes in safety levels at a firm. It is shown that safety will in general be underprovided and that in some cases government-enforced workmen's compensation can bring improvements. The results hold even though in equilibrium all workers are perfectly informed about the level of safety prevailing at each firm and each is free to move to any firm he likes.

This study investigates the anomalous findings of the previous insider trading studies that any investor can earn abnormal profits by reading the Official Summary. Availability of abnormal profits to insiders, availability of abnormal profits to outsiders who imitate insiders, determinants of insiders' predictive ability, and effect of insider trading on costs of trading for other investors are examined by using approximately 60,000 insider sale and purchase transactions from 1975 to 1981. Implications for market efficiency and evaluation of abnormal profits to active trading strategies are discussed.

Robert H. Litzenberger, Some Observations on Capital Structure and the Impact of Recent Recapitalizations on Share Prices, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 59-71

The word revolution is entirely appropriate for describing the changes in financial institutions and instruments that have occurred in the past twenty years. The major impulses to successful financial innovations have come from regulations and taxes. The outlook for the future is for a slowing down of the rate of financial innovation, but much growth and improvement are still in prospect.

Paul H. Malatesta, Measuring Abnormal Performance: The Event Parameter Approach Using Joint Generalized Least Squares, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 27-38

Auditing, Sampling, Substantive test, Sample size

This paper constructs a model of monopolistic competition where consumers cannot directly verify product quality prior to an initial purchase. Instead, con-sumers base initial purchases on observed prices, which perfectly signal firms' qualities both in and out of equilibrium. Equilibrium quality is less than efficient, but generally bounded away from the minimum quality. With free entry, observ-able product variety exceeds what would prevail with perfect information. As repeat purchases become large relative to initial purchases, or as firms become small relative to the size of the market, equilibrium product quality rises, and the market converges to the full information equilibrium. I.