Financial economists for the past two decades have attempted to explain why the equity premium is so high, now known as the equity premium puzzle (EPP). We model investor heterogeneity, market segmentation and optimal leverage, using the time separable standard power utility, market completeness and ignoring transaction costs to explain the EPP. We explain both the EPP and the related risk-free rate puzzle without resorting to preference modification. Furthermore, we show a unique interior equilibrium for the debt ratio, contrary to the work by F. Modigliani, M.H. Miller (The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment, American Economic Review 48 (1958) 261–297; Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital, American Economic Review 53 (1963), 433–443) and S.C. Myers (Presidential address: The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance 39 (1984), 575–592). Our simulations show the relevance of our models.

This paper investigates operational hedging by firms and how operational hedging is related to financial hedging by using a sample of 424 firm observations, which consist of 212 operationally hedged firms (firms with foreign sales) and a size- and industry-matched sample of 212 non-operationally hedged firms (firms with export sales). We find that non-operationally hedged firms use more financial hedging, relative to their levels of foreign currency exposure, as measured by the amount of export sales. On the other hand, though operationally hedged firms have more currency exposure, their usage of financial derivatives becomes much smaller than that of exporting firms. These results can explain why some global firms use very limited amount of financial derivatives for hedging purpose despite much higher levels of currency risk exposure. We also show that hedging increases firm value.

Unlike previous studies, this paper finds a consistent and highly significant relationship between beta and cross-sectional portfolio returns. The key distinction between our tests and previous tests is the recognition that the positive relationship between returns and beta predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model is based on expected rather than realized returns. In periods where excess market returns are negative, an inverse relationship between beta and portfolio returns should exist. When we adjust for the expectations concerning negative market excess returns, we find a consistent and significant relationship between beta and returns for the entire sample, for subsample periods, and for data divided by months in a year. Separately, we find support for a positive payment for beta risk.

This study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i.e., property rights, contracting rights, political institutions, and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms’ performance, capital markets development, and economic growth. Most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance, efficiency, and profitability, which percolates to economic growth. Privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks. Partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions, namely, the French civil law countries. The stronger the economic and the governing institutions, the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth. Overall, privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector.

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.

This paper studies pension fund design in the context of investment in the debt and equity of a firm. We employ a general equilibrium framework to demonstrate that: (i) the asset location ‘puzzle’ is purely a partial equilibrium phenomenon, conceived in a risk neutral setting, that disappears with the introduction of sufficient risk aversion; (ii) the inability of policy makers to manage an economy with multiple firms yields a mixed equilibrium, where bonds are observed in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts; and (iii) the Pareto-efficient pension plan comprises of a defined benefit plan.

The French derivatives market, the Marché à Terme International de France (MATIF) or the French International Futures and Options Exchange is one of the major derivatives markets in the world. The efficiency of four financial contracts traded on the MATIF-CAC40 Index Futures, ECU Bond Futures, National Bond Futures, and PIBOR 3-Month Futures are examined in this paper. Test results from serial correlations, unit root tests, and variance ratio tests provide overwhelming evidence that the random walk hypothesis cannot be rejected for these contracts.

Research shows that by enhancing visibility, advertising improves stock liquidity and returns. Unlike stock holders, bond holders may view advertising skeptically. Without proven effectiveness in improving revenues, large pre-interest advertising expenditures can be seen as eroding a firm's ability to meet its debt service obligations. We find that although greater advertising by a firm improves liquidity of its bonds in the market, it does not lower the firm's cost of debt. However, firms with ineffective advertising experience reduced bond market liquidity and a higher cost of debt. Without a real positive economic impact, advertising has little or no value for bond investors.