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Regulatory Limits to Risk Management

Review of Financial Studies 2023 36(6), 2175-2223
Variable annuities, the largest liability of U.S. life insurers, are investment products containing long-dated minimum return guarantees. I show that guarantees with similar economic risks are treated differently by regulation and these differences impact insurers’ hedging behavior. When the regulatory regime recognizes certain risks, insurers start to hedge these risks in a substantial way. For some guarantees, this involves hedging both interest rate and equity market risks. However, for others, it involves hedging only equity market risk. As the regulatory regime still does not recognize the interest rate risk of all guarantees, insurers remain exposed to substantial interest rate risk.

When Insurers Exit: Climate Losses, Fragile Insurers, and Mortgage Markets

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2026 open access
This paper uses a range of natural experiments to show how mispricing of climate risk in mortgages and property insurance creates large taxpayer exposures and leads to excess credit flows to risky areas. Our central finding is that the government-sponsored enterprises’ (GSEs) policies for evaluating property insurers are a crucial source of this mispricing. We assemble a comprehensive new dataset on both mortgages and insurance to analyze these dynamics in Florida from 2009-2018. We begin by documenting a breakdown in the quality of insurance provision, with new under-capitalized and under-diversified insurers dominating insurance markets. These fragile insurers have high rates of insolvency, which we show causally increases mortgage defaults after natural disasters. We find that the GSEs’ reliance on third-party ratings of insurers leads them to accept insurance from companies at high risk of insolvency without pricing for it. This creates large taxpayer exposures, with an estimated 25% of the GSEs’ expected losses in Florida coming from insurance fragility. Most starkly, we show that private lenders strategically respond to the GSE mispricing. Mortgage denial rates are sensitive to insurance quality in the jumbo segment where loans are retained, but not in the conforming segment where loans are offloaded to the GSEs. This suggests that, all else equal, fewer conforming mortgages would have been originated if lenders screened insurance fragility as they do in jumbos.

Pricing of Climate Risk Insurance: Regulation and Cross‐Subsidies

Journal of Finance 2026 81(3), 1161-1215
Homeowners insurance is central to managing the rising losses from climate‐related disasters. We show that insurance premiums are subject to starkly different regulations across states, creating persistent cross‐subsidies and price distortions. We employ states' regulatory rules in an instrumental variable estimation and a border discontinuity design to show insurers do not adjust rates in highly regulated states and compensate by raising rates in less regulated states. Rates and risks diverge in the long run, distorting cross‐state risk‐sharing and increasing insurer exits from highly regulated states. We argue these patterns stem from the interactions between rate regulation and insurers' financing constraints.

Institutional Corporate Bond Pricing

Review of Financial Studies 2026 39(3), 605-660
We propose an equilibrium corporate bond pricing model that accommodates the heterogeneity in institutional investors’ preferences and mandates in an empirically tractable way. Our model, estimated on rich holdings data, quantifies investors’ preferences and demand elasticities, with inelastic insurers focusing on the investment-grade segment, and elastic mutual funds substituting across ratings groups. The model offers a novel quantitative perspective of the effect of recent trends in institutional ownership on equilibrium credit spreads and the funding costs of corporations. Overall, our model emphasizes the composition of institutional demand as an important state variable for corporate bond pricing.