2 Of the many frustrations of any editor, surely, avoidable delay is the greatest. And this frustration is almost infinitely compounded when in the interim an unexpected death occurs. Professor Ferguson sent this manuscript as a draft; certain questions which he raised in the accompanying letter would normally have been resolved in the exchange of two or three letters or 'phone calls. I placed one call to learn he was ill; rather than press the query, I delayed. When next I 'phoned, I was shocked to learn of his completely unexpected and therefore all the more untimely death. Because the draft he sent contains so much of his own style and vigor, I have elected to print it in this incomplete form. The points he raised in his letter remain unclarified. In the face of this series of events, I have asked Professor Nell to undertake the task initially given to Ferguson. The two rarely saw things in the same way. Thus, the choice of Nell was not intended to finish Ferguson's incomplete assessment. I mention the foregoing simply to explain the unique treatment in these review essays. Of Charles Ferguson's death so little can be said-he was an ebullient souil, and a man of significant originality. -M. P.

I am grateful to Professors Ralph Andreano, Arthur S. Goldberger, and W. Lee Hansen of the University of Wisconsin for their encouragement and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Many valuable suggestions were contributed by two anonymous referees and the participants in the Workshop in Applied Welfare Economics at the University of Wisconsin, Fall 1970, especially Morley Gunderson. Charles Leitzke assisted in the arduous task of data collection. The usual caveat is applicable.

A recent study by Larner [11] concluded that the managerial revolution analyzed earlier by Berle and Means [4] was close to completion because a large percentage of the nation's 200 largest nonfinancial corporations was controlled by nonowner managers. This finding makes more significant any substantial differences in financial performance that may exist between owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms, and it increases the potential impact of numerous related theories; for example, see Berle [3], Donaldson [5], Gordon [6, 7 ], Mason [14], Monsen and Downs [16], Williamson [21], and others.

J. Walter Elliott, Forecasting and Analysis of Corporate Financial Performance with an Econometric Model of the Firm, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 2, Supplement: Outlook for the Securities Industry (Mar., 1972), pp. 1499-1526

J. L. Dake, Comment: An Empirical Test of Financial Ratio Analysis, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 2, Supplement: Outlook for the Securities Industry (Mar., 1972), pp. 1495-1497

A proposition is proved which shows that each member of an important class of investment and financing projects has a unique nonnegative internal rate of return. Nonuniqueness of the internal rate of return is thus shown to occur less frequently than formerly believed. The correspondence between the proposition and previous results on the uniqueness of the internal rate of return is briefly indicated.

Journal Article A Paradox in the Theory of Optimal Stabilization Get access A. J. Preston A. J. Preston Queen Mary College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 4, September 1972, Pages 423–432, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296510 Published: 01 September 1972

Journal Article On Producer Taxation Get access J. A. Mirrlees J. A. Mirrlees Nuffield College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 1, January 1972, Pages 105–111, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296447 Published: 01 January 1972

The paper deals with a measure theoretic model of a pure exchange economy. There are two kinds of traders: big traders, represented by atoms of the measure space, and small traders, represented by the atomless part of the measure space. The restriction of an allocation to the atomless sector is called competitive if there exists a price vector such that the consumption of every small trader is a maximal element (in terms of his preference) in the budget set defined by that price vector and by his initial endowment. We consider the set of allocations that are not blocked by any atomless coalition, or by the complement of any atomless coalition, and call it the 6~T2-core. The main results of the paper consist in defining sufficient conditions under which allocations in the Y'-core have a competitive restriction to the atomless sector, and vice versa. The economic implications and significance of the results are briefly discussed.