This paper compares the structural approach to economic policy analysis with the program evaluation approach. It offers a third way to do policy analysis that combines the best features of both approaches. We illustrate the value of this alternative approach by making the implicit economics of LATE explicit, thereby extending the interpretability and range of policy questions that LATE can answer.

Using a broad sample of international corporate bond offerings, we provide evidence that corporate borrowers make opportunistic currency choices, in that they denominate the currency of their bonds in a manner that is inconsistent with a belief in either covered or uncovered interest rate parity. Using firm-level tests, we identify a number of characteristics of firms that engage in opportunistic behavior. We observe that large issuers located in developed markets with investment-grade ratings and low cash flow characterize those firms that are responsive to covered borrowing rate differences across currencies. Corporate responsiveness to uncovered borrowing rate differences appears more general. We observe that although the gains firms achieve through opportunistic currency denomination are economically significant, the yield differential tends to systematically decline after issuance. This finding suggests that opportunistic issuance by corporations may be a primary mechanism for driving covered interest yields toward parity.

Following its opening to trade and foreign investment in the mid-1980s, Mexico's economic growth has been modest at best, particularly in comparison with that of China. Comparing these countries and reviewing the literature, we conclude that the relation between openness and growth is not a simple one. Using standard trade theory, we find that Mexico has gained from trade, and by some measures, more so than China. We sketch out a theory in which developing countries can grow faster than the United States by reforming. As a country becomes richer, this sort of catch-up becomes more difficult. Absent continuing reforms, Chinese growth is likely to slow down sharply, perhaps leaving China at a level less than Mexico's real GDP per working-age person.

Despite serious governance concerns revealed in Rule 144A and/or Regulation S Global Depositary Receipt (GDR) circulars, institutional investors voluntarily purchase these illiquid securities. Like issuers of Level III American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), GDR issuers exhibit strong pre-offer performance, with higher average Tobin's q ratios, sales growth rates, sales levels, returns on equity, and dividend payout ratios than their home-market counterparts. However, GDRs are issued predominantly by firms in emerging markets, while ADRs are issued mostly by firms in developed markets. After controlling for country and industry effects, we find that ADR issuers are larger and that they employ more reputable underwriters than GDR issuers do, but no other significant differences emerge. Notwithstanding their similarities, GDRs have larger discounts than ADRs, suggesting that legal bonding provides benefits that reputational bonding cannot fully replicate. However, within the sample of GDRs, pre-offer performance attributes also influence pricing. Specifically, discounts vary inversely with issue size but directly with firm size, suggesting that economies of scale exist in the GDR issue process and that potential agency costs are higher in larger firms. GDR discounts also vary inversely with incremental returns on equity in all partitions of the data, indicating the importance of pre-offer profitability in establishing the reputation of the issuing firm and in increasing the GDR offer price.

This paper studies the determinants of the equity premium as implied by producers’ first-order conditions. A simple closed form expression is presented for the Sharpe ratio as a function of investment volatility and technology parameters. Calibrated to the US postwar economy, the model can match the historical first and second moments of the market return and the risk-free interest rate. The model also generates a very volatile Sharpe ratio and market price of risk.

We test the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of irrationality-induced financial anomalies by sorting securities on their individual residual variability as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk – a commonly asserted limit to arbitrage – and comparing the strength of anomalous returns in low versus high residual variability portfolios. We find no support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain undervaluation anomalies (small value stocks, value stocks generally, recent winners, and positive earnings surprises) but strong support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain overvaluation anomalies (small growth stocks, growth stocks generally, recent losers, and negative earnings surprises). Other tests also fail to support the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of overvaluation anomalies and suggest that at least some of the factor premiums for size, book-to-market, and momentum are unrelated to irrationality protected by limits to arbitrage.

Les auteurs examinent l’incidence de la demande inhérente que supposent les positions courtes en étudiant dans quelle mesure les réactions des cours boursiers à la publication des résultats dépendent du niveau des positions courtes. Selon leurs constatations, si les nouvelles publiées sont extrêmement positives ou extrêmement négatives, la demande inhérente entraîne à la hausse le cours des actions à proximité de la date de la publication des résultats, la hausse étant plus prononcée dans le cas des nouvelles positives que des nouvelles négatives. Plus précisément, la réaction initiale du marchéà des résultats imprévus extrêmement positifs est plus importante dans le cas d’entreprises ayant des niveaux élevés de positions à découvert. En revanche, lorsque les résultats imprévus sont extrêmement négatifs, la réaction initiale du marché est moins négative dans le cas d’entreprises dont le niveau des positions à découvert est élevé. Les auteurs constatent au surplus que l’ampleur du mouvement réactif suivant la publication des résultats est plus modeste (plus marquée) dans le cas de résultats imprévus extrêmement positifs (négatifs) pour les entreprises dont les positions à découvert sont importantes.