The Great Recession focused attention on large financial institutions and systemic risk. We investigate whether large size provides any cost advantages to the economy and, if so, whether these cost advantages are due to technological scale economies or too-big-to-fail subsidies. Estimating scale economies is made more complex by risk-taking. Better diversification resulting from larger scale generates scale economies but also incentives to take more risk. When this additional risk-taking adds to cost, it can obscure the underlying scale economies and engender misleading econometric estimates of them. Using data pre- and post-crisis, we estimate scale economies using two production models. The standard model ignores endogenous risk-taking and finds little evidence of scale economies. The model accounting for managerial risk preferences and endogenous risk-taking finds large scale economies, which are not driven by too-big-to-fail considerations. We evaluate the costs and competitive implications of breaking up the largest banks into smaller banks.

During the late 1990s, the SEC alleged that banks were overstating loan loss allowances to establish cookie jar reserves. Their intervention in bank accounting culminated in 2001 with new guidance (SAB 102) designed to improve financial reporting quality. We show that banks' allowance estimation changed in response to the SEC's intervention. While allowance informativeness (as proxied by the ability to explain future losses) improved for Strong Banks, informativeness declined for Weak Banks whose incentives are to understate allowances. Our results help to explain why some (Weak) banks delayed loss recognition during the recent financial crisis.

Teacher compensation schemes are often criticized for lacking a performance-based component. Proponents argue that teacher incentive pay can raise student achievement and stimulate system-wide innovation. We examine a group-based teacher incentive scheme implemented in New York City and investigate whether specific features of the program contributed to its ineffectiveness. Although overall the program had little effect on student achievement, we show that in schools where incentives to free ride were weakest, the program led to small increases in math achievement. Our results underscore the importance of carefully considering the design of teacher incentive pay programs.

In capital-intensive industries, firms face complicated multi-staged financing, investment, and production decisions under the watchful eye of existing and potential industry rivals. In various representations of this environment, we show that a first-mover advantage in debt weakly dominates a first-mover advantage in capacity. Without a first-mover advantage in debt, the incumbent may suffer a dead-weight loss. When both the entrant and incumbent deploy debt prior to capacity, a first-mover in capacity benefits from softer competition. With a long-purse debt cost, leading in debt still remains advantageous.

Material adverse change (MAC) clauses are a ubiquitous feature of acquisitions and exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation in the number and types of events that are excluded from being material adverse events (MAEs). MAEs are the underlying cause of 69% ofacquisition terminations and 80% of renegotiations. These renegotiations lead to substantial changes in the price offered to target shareholders. Acquisitions with fewer MAE exclusions are characterized by wider arbitrage spreads during the acquisition period and are associated with higher offer premiums. We conclude that MAC clauses have an economically important impact on the dynamics of corporate acquisitions.