Donald Trump’s 2016 election and his nomination of climate skeptic Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations about U.S. policy toward climate change. Joseph Biden’s 2020 election shifted them dramatically upward. We study firms’ stock-price movements in reaction to these changes. As expected, the 2016 election boosted carbon-intensive firms. Surprisingly, firms with climate-responsible strategies also gained, especially those firms held by long-run investors. Such investors appear to have bet on a “boomerang” in climate policy. Harbingers of a boomerang appeared during Trump’s term. The 2020 election marked its arrival.

We analyze a firm’s choice between dividends and stock repurchases under heterogeneous beliefs. Firm insiders, owning a certain fraction of equity, choose between paying out cash available through a dividend payment or a stock repurchase, and simultaneously choose the scale of the firm’s project. Outsiders have heterogeneous beliefs about project success and may disagree with insiders. In equilibrium, the firm distributes value through dividends alone, through a repurchase alone, or through a combination of both. In some situations, the firm may raise external financing to fund its payout. We also develop results for long-run stock returns following dividends and repurchases. (JEL G32, G35) Received June 2, 2020; editorial decision November 3, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

In November 2011, the Financial Stability Board, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, published a list of 29 "systemically important financial institutions" (SIFIs, now referred to as "globally systemically important banks" or G-SIBs), institutions whose failure, by virtue of "their size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness", could have dramatic negative consequences for the global financial system. While "size" and "interconnectedness" have been the subject of much quantitative analysis, less attention has been paid to measuring "complexity." Yet without a consistent way to measure complexity, there is little guarantee that the designated SIFIs capture the complexity that the FSB is concerned about, and little hope of mitigating the consequences that the FSB warns of. In this paper we propose the structure of an individual firm's majority-control hierarchy as a proxy for institutional complexity. We demonstrate as a proof-of-concept how this method might be used by bank supervisors, particularly the Federal Reserve under its authority as consolidated supervisor, using a data set containing information on the majority-control hierarchies of many of the designated SIFIs. Our mathematical intrafirm network representation (and various associated metrics we propose) provides a uniform way to compare firms with often very disparate organizational structures – one that is distinct from a simple size comparison.

We find that the movement of urban house prices in the U.S. has become more synchronized since the early 2000s. The elevated comovement is substantial, widespread, occurring for the majority of city-pairs, and continued even after the housing market turned to bust in 2007. We investigate whether and to what extent the comovement increase can be explained by banking integration following deregulations in the banking industry. Utilizing novel measures of city-level banking integration based on bank deposit data, we find that an increase in banking integration leads to an increase in the comovement of urban house prices. City-pairs that are more connected through national banking system had experienced a greater increase in comovement, after controlling for a variety of explanatory variables. Our findings can be interpreted as spillover effect, rather than substitution effect, of banking integration at work.

How does personal exposure to economic conditions affect individual human capital investment choices? Focusing on bachelor’s degree recipients, we find that cohorts exposed to higher unemployment rates during typical schooling years select majors that earn higher wages, have better employment prospects, and lead to work in a related field. Conditional on expected earnings, recessions also encourage women to enter male-dominated fields, and students of both genders pursue more difficult majors. We conclude that economic environments change how students select majors, and we find evidence that students who respond to the business cycle enjoy earnings typical of their new majors.

We provide evidence on earnings management by exploiting temporary exogenous shocks to utility firms’ sales arising from weather variation. We find that sample firms’ sales are highly sensitive to annual changes in average temperatures in the region where the firm operates, but this sensitivity disappears quickly as one moves down the income statement. This evidence, while indirect, is suggestive of earnings management activities. In search of direct evidence, we study charitable giving decisions by sample firms and uncover a significant positive sensitivity of charitable spending to weather-driven demand shocks, behavior that is highly consistent with the presence of real earnings management efforts. We find no convincing evidence supporting possible alternative explanations for this evidence, but we do find limited support for the presence of a larger giving–weather relation when earnings management incentives are likely to be elevated. If other real decisions with similar characteristics scale proportionally to charitable giving, our findings suggest that the overall magnitude of real earnings management activities could be quite substantial.

Most firms covary more positively with downmarkets than upmarkets—a phenomenon I refer to as “risk asymmetry.” I predict and find that risk asymmetry is caused, at least in part, by a firm's ability to selectively obfuscate poor performance. Risk asymmetry decreases significantly when firms are required to adhere to the more stringent auditing standards mandated under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, however this decrease is more muted for firms with weak internal controls. Consistent with my predictions, these patterns are stronger for more market‐sensitive firms and weaker for firms that include relative performance evaluation in their CEOs' pay packages. Taken together with prior literature (which documents that risk asymmetry is priced), my results suggest that a firm can lower its cost of capital by credibly reducing its ability to obfuscate value‐relevant information.

Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private information) and the cost of ameliorating the problem (e.g., costs associated with disclosure). Traditionally these forces are modelled independently. In this paper, we use a simple model to motivate empirical predictions in a setting where these forces are jointly determined––where greater adverse selection entails greater costs of disclosure. We show that joint determination of these forces generates a pronounced non-linearity in the probability of voluntary disclosure. We find that this non-linearity is empirically descriptive of multiple measures of voluntary disclosure in two distinct empirical settings that are commonly thought to feature both private information and proprietary costs: capital investments and sales to major customers.