This paper is an ‘event-time’ study of the common stock prices of a sample of 658 corporations around the dates on which they publicly announced their future capital expenditure plans. For industrial firms, announcements of increases (decreases) in planned capital expenditures are associated with significant positive (negative) excess stock returns. For public utility firm, neither increases nor decreases in planned capital expenditures are associated with significant excess stock returns. We interpret the evidence as being consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek to maximize the market value of the firm in making their corporate capital expenditure decisions.

[Futures contracts often include a variety of delivery options that allow participants flexibility in satisfying the contract. These options have the potential to broaden the appeal of the contract. However, if these options are valuable, they may reduce the hedging effectiveness of the contract. This article analyzes the GNMA CDR futures contract that appears to have failed because of flaws in the contract's design. For the first 6 years following its introduction, the contract attracted significant and increasing volume, but, subsequently, the volume declined to almost zero. Over the years during which the volume experienced its most dramatic decline, the Treasury-bond futures contract provided a better hedge for current coupon GNMA securities than did the GNMA CDR futures contract. And, over this same period, the value of the quality option embedded in the contract often exceeded 5 percent of the futures price and reached a level of 19 percent at one point. We interpret the evidence to indicate that the contract failed because the delivery options reduced the hedging effectiveness of the contract for current coupon mortgage securities.]

This paper presented a stochastic discounted cash flow model with which mortgage companies can assess the value of a mortgage servicing contract. The model was illustrated with data provided by a group of eight MBC's. Simulation and sensitivity analysis showed the impact of different mortgage amounts, termination distributions, and expected rates of servicing cost increases on the value of a mortgage servicing portfolio. In general, because servicing contracts are long-term fixed revenue arrangements, high rates of servicing cost increases substantially reduce the value of an MBC's servicing portfolio. To the extent that mortgage prepayments are reduced by high inflation rates, the impact of high cost increases on the value of a servicing portfolio is compounded.

Between 1993 and 2000, at least 18 countries saw publication of guidelines proposing minimum representation of outside directors on corporate boards. Underlying this movement is an apparent presumption that boards with significant outside directors will make different and, perhaps, better decisions than boards dominated by insiders. As the first-mover in this movement, the United Kingdom provides a laboratory for a “natural experiment” to examine this presumption empirically. We find that UK boards that complied with the exogenously imposed standard were more likely to appoint outside chief executive officers (CEOs). Additionally, announcement period stock returns indicate that investors appear to view appointments of outside CEOs as good news. Apparently, boards with more outside directors make different (and perhaps better) decisions.

This study analyzes corporate expenditures for property, plant and equipment (PP&E), and research and development (R&D) for over 2500 US firms from 1988 to 1994. We find no support for the contention that institutional investors cause corporate managers to behave myopically. Indeed, we document a positive relation between industry-adjusted expenditures for PP&E and R&D and the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors. This relation is robust to a variety of empirical tests, including those that account for endogeneity between institutional ownership and firm-level discretionary expenditures.

This study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve-outs in which managers value control over assets and are reluctant to carve out subsidiaries. Thus, managers undertake carve-outs only when the firm is capital constrained. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and high leverage prior to carve-outs. Also consistent with this hypothesis, in carve-outs wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess stock return of + 6.63 percent is significantly greater than the average excess stock return of −0.01 percent for carve-outs wherein funds are retained for investment purposes.

This article documents the effect on share value of listing on the New York Stock Exchange and reports the results of a joint test of Robert C. Merton's (1987) investor recognition factor and Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson's (1986) liquidity factor as explanations of the change in share value. The authors find that, during the 1980s, stocks earned abnormal returns of 5 percent in response to the listing announcement and that listing is associated with an increase in the number of shareholders and a reduction in bid-ask spreads. Cross-sectional regressions provide support for both investor recognition and liquidity as sources of value from exchange listing.

This paper examines the hypothesis that an important role of corporate takeovers is to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. The authors document that the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offer-takeovers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under-performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post-takeover change in the top executive. We interpret the results to indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling the nonvalue maximizing behavior of top corporate managers.

This paper is an in-depth investigation of 61 publicly-traded firms that chose to liquidate voluntarily on a piecemeal basis during the 1970s and 1980s. In comparison with their industry peers, these firms have lower Tobin's Q, a higher percentage of equity ownership by management and the board, a higher incidence of a member of the corporation's founding family in a key executive position or on the board, and a higher incidence of asset sales and prior attempts to transfer control of the firm. The average excess stock return of 20% around liquidation announcements is positively correlated with the fraction of stock owned by management and the board. These results suggest that firms that make the value enhancing decision to voluntarily liquidate confront low future growth opportunities, but the absence of future growth opportunities is not sufficient to bring about this decision. It is also necessary that decision makers have a vested interest in the outcome, either because of their ownership stake or because of their family affiliation with the business, and that the valuation consequences of the decision are greater, the more closely aligned are managerial and shareholder interests.