This article examines the link between several well-known asset pricing “anomalies” and the covariance structure of returns. I find size, book-to-market, and momentum strategies exhibit a strong, weak, and negligible relation to covariance risk, respectively. A size factor helps predict future volatility and covariation, improving the efficiency of investment strategies. Moreover, its premium rises following increases in both its volatility and covariation with other assets. These effects are amplified in recessions. No such relations exist for book-to-market or momentum. These findings may shed light on explanations for these premia and present a challenging set of facts for future theory.

This article examines the link between several well-known asset pricing "anomalies" and the covariance structure of returns. I find size, book-to-market, and momentum strategies exhibit a strong, weak, and negligible relation to covariance risk, respectively. A size factor helps predict future volatility and covariation, improving the efficiency of investment strategies. Moreover, its premium rises following increases in both its volatility and covariation with other assets. These effects are amplified in recessions. No such relations exist for book-to-market or momentum. These findings may shed light on explanations for these premia and present a challenging set of facts for future theory.

Sports betting markets offer a novel laboratory to test theories of cross‐sectional asset pricing anomalies. Two features of this market—no systematic risk and terminal values exogenous to betting activity—evade the joint hypothesis problem, allowing mispricing to be detected. Examining a large and diverse set of liquid betting contracts, I find strong evidence of momentum, consistent with delayed overreaction and inconsistent with underreaction and rational pricing. Returns are a fraction of those in financial markets and fail to overcome transactions costs, preventing arbitrage from eliminating them. An insight from betting also predicts value and momentum returns in U.S. equities.

Despite their strong positive average returns across numerous asset classes, momentum strategies can experience infrequent and persistent strings of negative returns. These momentum crashes are partly forecastable. They occur in panic states, following market declines and when market volatility is high, and are contemporaneous with market rebounds. The low ex ante expected returns in panic states are consistent with a conditionally high premium attached to the option like payoffs of past losers. An implementable dynamic momentum strategy based on forecasts of momentum’s mean and variance approximately doubles the alpha and Sharpe ratio of a static momentum strategy and is not explained by other factors. These results are robust across multiple time periods, international equity markets, and other asset classes.

We examine the role of shorting, firm size, and time on the profitability of size, value, and momentum strategies. We find that long positions make up almost all of size, 60% of value, and half of momentum profits. Shorting becomes less important for momentum and more important for value as firm size decreases. The value premium decreases with firm size and is weak among the largest stocks. Momentum profits, however, exhibit no reliable relation with size. These effects are robust over 86 years of US equity data and almost 40 years of data across four international equity markets and five asset classes. Variation over time and across markets of these effects is consistent with random chance. We find little evidence that size, value, and momentum returns are significantly affected by changes in trading costs or institutional and hedge fund ownership over time.

We parsimoniously characterize the severity of market frictions affecting a stock using the delay with which its price responds to information. The most delayed firms command a large return premium not explained by size, liquidity, or micro-structure effects. Moreover, delay captures part of the size effect, idiosyncratic risk is priced only among the most delayed firms, and earnings dirft is monotonically increasing in delay. Frictions associated with investor recognition appear most responsible for the delay effect. The very small segment of delayed firms, comprising only 0.02% of the market, generates substantial variation in average returns, highlighting the importance of frictions.

There are relatively few direct tests of the economic effects of asymmetric information because of the difficulty in identifying exogenous information measures. We propose a novel exogenous measure of information based on the quality of property tax assessments in different regions and apply this to the U.S. commercial real estate market. We find strong evidence that information considerations are significant. Market participants resolve information asymmetries by purchasing nearby properties, trading properties with long income histories, and avoiding transactions with informed professional brokers. The evidence that the choice of financing is used to address information concerns is mixed and weak.

We develop a model of informal financial networks and present corroborating evidence by studying the role of property brokers in the U.S. commercial real estate market. Our model demonstrates that service intermediaries, who do not themselves supply loans, can facilitate their clients' access to finance through informal relationships with lenders. Empirically we find that, controlling for endogenous broker selection, hiring a broker strikingly increases the probability of obtaining bank finance. Our results demonstrate that even in the United States, with its well-developed capital markets, informal networks play an important role in controlling access to finance.

Financial regulation was as hotly debated a political issue in the 19th century as it is today. We study the political economy of state usury laws in 19th century America. Exploiting the wide variation in regulation, enforcement, and economic conditions across states and time, we find that usury laws when binding reduce credit and economic activity, especially for smaller firms. We examine the motives of regulation and find that usury laws coincide with other economic and political policies favoring wealthy political incumbents, particularly when they have more voting power. The evidence suggests financial regulation is driven by private interests capturing rents from others rather than public interests protecting the underserved.