ABSTRACT Basel III introduced the first global banking liquidity requirement: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). This paper examines whether loosening the regulatory accounting for the LCR, by including certain municipal bonds in its computation, has a spillover effect on the municipal bond market. In contrast to statements made by regulators, I find that the rule decreases affected bonds’ yield spread, relative to unaffected bonds, due to an increase in nonfundamental bank demand for the affected bonds. The regulation also has a real effect on bond issuance: municipalities that can issue either affected or unaffected bonds change their behavior by issuing relatively more of the affected bonds. This suggests that regulatory accounting changes can affect the economic behavior of entities that are not even subject to the regulation. JEL Classifications: H74; G21; G28; M40.

Abstract We examine whether variation in regulatory leniency is associated with the cost of deposits in the banking industry. We predict that lenient regulatory supervision allows for greater bank risk-taking due to delayed intervention, resulting in a higher cost of deposits. Our main finding is a positive association between banks’ cost of uninsured deposits and the leniency of their state regulators, incremental to observable measures of risk and performance. We further show that this result is stronger for riskier banks and when uninsured depositors have a greater ability or incentive to influence deposit rates. These findings suggest that the leniency of bank regulators is priced in uninsured deposit rates and further our understanding of the factors associated with regulatory leniency in the banking industry.