This paper examines lending by a Genoese‐led cartel to philip II of Spain (1556–98) from the perspective of theory on sovereign debt. Models in this literature suggest that the Genoese linked specie deliveries from Spain to the Low Countries to lending in order to create a penalty to enforce their loans. The king tried to renege, the Genoese applied the penalty, and the king ultimately repaid: When the episode is used to examine theory, the Crown's observed debt ceiling and estimates of its cost of enduring the penalty and its ability to repay are in line with predctions of Bulow and Rogoff. The nature of the penalty has the flavor of Gole and Kehoe's model; its observation on the “path of play” is suggestive of Atkeson's model.

We document large racial disparities in the ability of homeowners to access their accumulated housing wealth. Minority homeowners are significantly more likely to have their mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) product applications rejected than White homeowners, and the unconditional disparities are significantly larger than those found in prior studies that focused on purchase and rate/term refinance loans. Had Black homeowners faced the same MEW denial rate as White homeowners in our sample period we show they would have extracted an additional $11.2 billion in housing equity, or almost 25% of the total amount of actual equity extracted. Controlling for key underwriting variables significantly narrows the racial disparities, with the Black–White gap falling by nearly 85%, and the Hispanic-White gap falling by more than 75%. Credit scores and debt-to-income ratios are the most important factors explaining the gaps, while differences in loan-to-value ratios contribute only modestly. “Residual” disparities after conditioning on observable underwriting factors are large and vary significantly across lenders. A battery of tests suggests that differences in unobserved underwriting factors are unlikely to fully explain the residual disparities, which tend to be larger in geographic areas characterized by more racial animus.

We present a general method for computing the set of supergame equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and public randomization. We present a three-stage algorithm that constructs a convex set containing the set of equilibrium values, constructs another convex set contained in the set of equilibrium values, and produces strategies that support them. We explore the properties of this algorithm by applying it to familiar games.

An expansion in mortgage credit to subprime borrowers is widely believed to have been a principal driver of the 2002-2006 U.S. house price boom. By contrast, this paper documents a robust, negative correlation between the growth in the share of purchase mortgages to subprime borrowers and house price appreciation at the county-level during this time. Using two different instrumental variables approaches, we also establish causal evidence that house price appreciation lowered the share of purchase loans to subprime borrowers. Further analysis using micro-level credit bureau data shows that higher house price appreciation reduced the transition rate into first-time homeownership for subprime individuals. Finally, the paper documents that subprime borrowers did not play a significant role in the increased speculative activity and underwriting fraud that the literature has linked directly to the housing boom. Taken together, these results are more consistent with subprime borrowers being priced out of housing boom markets rather than inflating prices in those markets.

We test for pricing disparities in mortgage contracts using a novel data set that allows us to observe the race and ethnicity of both parties to the loan. We find that minorities pay between 3% and 5% more in fees than similarly qualified whites when obtaining a loan through the same white broker. Critically, we find that the premium paid by minorities depends on the race of the broker. We also examine recent policy changes around broker compensation rules that may not only reduce these price disparities but may also limit access to credit for minorities.

ABSTRACT We examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market. We show that the majority of additional risk associated with “low‐doc” mortgages originated prior to the Great Recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to. We provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income. Our analysis suggests that recent regulatory changes that have essentially eliminated the low‐doc loan product would result in credit rationing against self‐employed borrowers.

We explore an overlooked phenomenon in mortgage markets: repayment of underwater mortgages. Using a sample of mortgages terminated between 2007 and 2016, we show that such repayment indeed occurs, and that it is affected by the same factors commonly used in studies of default: the magnitude of home equity and the borrower’s credit score, which captures default cost as well as liquidity. A novel insight is that underwater repayers, unlike most defaulters, are not liquidity constrained, providing a much cleaner environment to study default costs. We estimate lower bounds on these costs. Our results indicate that default costs are substantial.