Recent work in the supply chain literature suggests that the variance in orders placed with suppliers will be larger than that of sales to buyers. This distortion in demand information increases as it is passed along the supply chain from customers to upstream suppliers and has been referred to as “the bullwhip effect.” In this paper, we argue that the bullwhip effect reduces the ability of order backlog to predict future sales and earnings for upstream suppliers. Results obtained from our empirical analysis support this proposition. We find that the impact of bullwhip on the predictive ability of order backlog is further accentuated in firms with longer operating cycles. Market intermediaries such as financial analysts, on average, are unable to fully account for differences in the predictive ability of order backlog. However, analysts belonging to employers that follow all firms in a vertical supply chain do a better job of understanding the impact of bullwhip on the predictive ability of order backlog. In additional tests, we find that the bullwhip effect also impedes the ability of inventory components to predict future sales and earnings.

We examine the impact on share prices of firms whose CEOs and CFOs certify their financial statements under oath, pursuant to the administrative order issued by the SEC on June 27, 2002. We hypothesize that (1) the certification provides assurance to investors by making disclosure more credible and by reducing information asymmetry between owners and management, and (2) the assurance value of certification is reflected in the stock price of the certifying company. Overall, the empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses. We observe, on average, positive abnormal returns for firms whose CEOs/CFOs certified their financial statements by August 14, 2002. Based on an analysis of bid-ask spreads, certifying firms experienced a significant decline in information asymmetry after certification. In cross-sectional analyses, we find abnormal returns are positively associated with firms that were under investigation, that used Andersen as their auditor, and that practiced aggressive revenue recognition.