In this paper I develop and estimate a model of on-the-job search in which risk averse workers choose search effort and can borrow or save using a single risk free asset. I derive the implications for optimal savings behavior in this environment and relate this to the frictions that characterize the endogenous earnings process implied by on-the-job search. Savings behavior depends in a very intuitive way on the rate at which offers are received, the rate at which jobs are destroyed, and a worker's current rank in the wage distribution. The implication is that workers, who are identical in terms of preferences and opportunities, have substantially different savings behavior depending on their history and current position in the wage distribution. The mechanism that generates the substantial differences in savings behavior in the model is the dynamic of the “wage ladder” resulting from the search process. There is an important asymmetry between the incremental wage increases generated by onthe-job search (climbing the ladder) and the drop in income associated with job loss (falling off the ladder). The behavior of workers in low paying jobs is primarily governed by the expectation of wage growth, while the behavior of workers near the top of the distribution is driven by the possibility of job loss. The distributions of earnings, wealth and consumption implied by the model (suitably aggregated) align reasonably well with the data, with the notable exception of implying substantially less concentration of wealth among the richest one percent of the population.

We construct a structural model of on-the-job search in which workers differ in skills along several dimensions and sort themselves into jobs with heterogeneous skill requirements along those same dimensions. Skills are accumulated when used, and depreciate when not used. We estimate the model combining data from O*NET with the NLSY79. We use the model to shed light on the origins and costs of mismatch along heterogeneous skill dimensions. We highlight the deficiencies of relying on a unidimensional model of skill when decomposing the sources of variation in the value of lifetime output between initial conditions and career shocks. (JEL J24, J41, J64)

We develop an equilibrium model of on-the-job search with ex ante heterogeneous workers and firms, aggregate uncertainty, and vacancy creation. The model produces rich dynamics in which the distributions of unemployed workers, vacancies, and worker-firm matches evolve stochastically over time. We prove that the surplus function, which fully characterizes the match value and the mobility decision of workers, does not depend on these distributions. This result means the model is tractable and can be estimated. We illustrate the quantitative implications of the model by fitting to US aggregate labor market data from 1951–2012. The model has rich implications for the cyclical dynamics of the distribution of skills of the unemployed, the distribution of types of vacancies posted, and sorting between heterogeneous workers and firms. (JEL E24, E32, J24, J63, J64)

In this article, we analyse the dynamics of intra-household allocations using unique panel data on individual-specific consumption expenditures and time used for leisure, market production, and home production. Cross-sectional differences at the time of marriage in expected wage profiles between a husband and wife strongly affect the allocation of private consumption expenditures and time use by households in the cross section. There are substantial gender asymmetries in these allocations. Even for households where the husband and wife have identical wages, the private consumption expenditures for the wife are about half those for the husband. Within a given household over time, shocks to wages lead households to shift the relative weights in favour of the spouse receiving the favourable shock. Additionally, we find that households adjust the weights in response to large but not to small shocks; the adjustment to the weights is twice as large in the year leading up to a divorce; and adjustments are more frequent in dual- than in single-earner households. We interpret the data using a dynamic collective model of the household with potentially limited commitment.

To what extent is a worker's human capital growth affected by the quality of his coworkers? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a model in which the productivity and the human capital growth of an individual depend on the average human capital of his coworkers. The measured production function is supermodular: The marginal product of a more knowledgeable individual is increasing in the human capital of his coworkers. The measured human capital accumulation function is convex: An individual's human capital growth is increasing in coworkers' human capital only when paired with more knowledgeable coworkers, but independent of coworkers' human capital when paired with less knowledgeable coworkers. Learning from coworkers accounts for two thirds of the stock of human capital accumulated on the job. Technological changes that increase production supermodularity lead to labor market segregation and, by reducing the opportunities for low human capital workers to learn from better coworkers, lead to a decline in aggregate human capital and output.