Abstract As of 2019, salary history bans were enacted by 17 states and Puerto Rico with the stated purpose of reducing the gender pay gap. We argue that salary history bans may negatively affect wages as employers lose an informative signal of worker productivity. We empirically evaluate these laws using a large panel dataset of disaggregated wages covering all public-sector employees in 36 states and find, on average, that salary history bans lead to a 3% decrease in new-hire wages. We find no decrease in the gender pay gap in the full sample and a modest 1.5% increase in the relative wages of women, as compared to men, among new hires most likely to have experienced gender discrimination historically.

Abstract Financial markets reveal information that firm managers can utilize when making equity value-enhancing investment decisions. However, for firms with risky debt, such investments are not necessarily socially efficient. Despite this friction, we show that learning from prices improves investment efficiency. This effect is asymmetric, however, as investors learn less about projects that decrease the riskiness of cash flows: efficiency is lower for diversifying investments than for focusing (risk-increasing) investments. This also implies that investors’ endogenous learning further attenuates risk shifting but amplifies debt overhang. Our model provides a novel channel through which learning from financial markets affects agency frictions between stakeholders.

Abstract The data-generating process underlying productivity includes both trend and business cycle shocks, generating counterfactuals for prices under full information. In practice, agents’ inability to immediately distinguish between the two shocks creates “rational confusion”: each shock inherits properties of its counterpart. This confusion magnifies the perceived share of permanent shocks and implies that, contrary to canonical frameworks, transitory shocks are the main driver of long-run risk through trendy business cycles. With learning, the equity premium turns positive, while investment and valuation ratios become procyclical, as in the data. Consequently, rational confusion is key for reconciling disciplined macro-dynamics with equilibrium Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Abstract Stock prices aggregate investor information about investment opportunities and reflect managerial performance. These dual roles may be in tension: when prices are more informative about investment opportunities, they may be less effective at incentivizing managerial effort. This tradeoff has novel consequences. Lower information costs can lead to both more efficient investment but lower firm value. The principal may strictly prefer to delegate investment to a manager who has no informational advantage and makes ex-post inefficient choices. Investment in diversifying and (ex-ante) negative NPV projects mitigate agency problems. Finally, standard measures of price efficiency provide an incomplete picture of firm value.

No. In the presence of speculative opportunities, investors can learn about both asset fundamentals and the beliefs of other traders. We show that this learning exhibits complementarity: learning more along one dimension increases the value of learning about the other. As a result, regulatory changes may be counterproductive. First, increasing transparency (i.e., making fundamental information cheaper to acquire) can make prices less informative when investors respond by learning relatively more about others. Second, public disclosures discourage private learning about fundamentals, while encouraging information acquisition about others. Accordingly, disclosing more fundamental information can decrease overall informational efficiency by decreasing price informativeness. Received April 20, 2016; editorial decision September 30, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

ABSTRACT The psychology literature documents that individuals derive current utility from their beliefs about future events. We show that, as a result, investors in financial markets choose to disagree about both private information and price information. When objective price informativeness is low, each investor dismisses the private signals of others and ignores price information. In contrast, when prices are sufficiently informative, heterogeneous interpretations arise endogenously: most investors ignore prices, while the rest condition on it. Our analysis demonstrates how observed deviations from rational expectations (e.g., dismissiveness, overconfidence) arise endogenously, interact with each other, and vary with economic conditions.