We develop a 10-K-based multidimensional measure of firm locations. Using this measure, we show that firm-level information is geographically distributed and institutional investors are able to exploit the resulting information asymmetry. Specifically, institutional investors overweigh firms whose 10-K frequently mentions the investors' state even when those firms are not headquartered locally and earn superior returns on those stocks. These ownership and performance patterns are stronger among hard-to-value firms. Local investor performance increases with the degree of local bias and with the local economic exposure of portfolio firms. Overall, geographical variation in firm-level information generates economically significant location-based information asymmetry.

Corporate insiders have superior access to information; their trades, particularly purchases, should be informative. However, the extent of their informational advantage may be limited by the presence of other informed market participants. We document less frequent insider purchases in stocks with relatively high options trading activity. These purchases are followed by negligible abnormal returns. In contrast, stocks with less active options trading experience more frequent insider purchases, which yield positive abnormal returns over the subsequent six months. Our novel approach highlights the options market's role in screening uninformed insider trades, which ultimately contributes to more efficient stock market price formation.

One of the most prominent stylized facts in corporate finance is that equity issues tend to follow periods of high stock returns. We document that firms exhibit such timing behavior only in response to high returns that coincide with strong institutional investor demand. When not accompanied by institutional purchases, stock price increases have little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. The results highlight the importance of market reception for the timing of equity issues.

This paper examines the role of institutional trading during the option backdating scandal of 2006–2007. Unlike their inability to anticipate other corporate events, institutional investors as a group display negative abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell volumes) in anticipation of firm-specific backdating exposures. Consistent with informed trading, the underlying trades earn positive abnormal short- and long-term profits. Moreover, the negative abnormal imbalances are larger in magnitude when backdating is likely a more severe issue. Local institutions, in particular, display negative trading imbalances earlier in event-time and earn consistently higher trading profits than non-local institutions. Although we find some evidence of over-reaction following the arrival of information about the backdating scandal, these patterns are short-lived and exclusively due to the activity of non-local institutions. Overall, institutional investors behave as informed investors, particularly in local stocks, during this prolonged period of heightened uncertainty about corporate reporting and governance practices.

Abstract We conduct a randomized field experiment (RFE) to assess whether startup firms perceive accounting expertise as an important investor credential. We send 13,358 unsolicited and unique emails to active startup firms across the US, showing an interest in them with a proposition to meet a bogus investor. The experiment has high response rates, with 4,535 (33.94%) opened emails and 828 (6.19%) website visits, reflecting investors’ proliferating practice of outbound origination to contact new startups. Our RFE compares startup reactions to fictitious investors with certified public accountant (CPA) designations versus two control groups: investors without credentials and those with other professional licenses. Startup firms are 48% likelier to read unsolicited emails from CPA-bearing investors and 47% likelier to visit their websites, relative to investors with a medical license. We document an analogous preference for CPA-bearing investors even when we separately analyze startups in medical-related industries. This gap persists when investors pose as angels, venture capitalists (VCs), or without professional licenses. The relatively low percentage (2.5%) of email bounces and spam reports makes it unlikely that spam algorithms drive the findings. Further tests reveal that the response rates differ by firm age, which is inconsistent with spam filter explanations but congruent with startup firms’ demand for accounting expertise. Finally, we undertake a follow-up experiment with 3,443 new startups to distinguish between accounting and general business expertise using a master’s in business administration (MBA). Startups are 13.8% likelier to read emails from a CPA-bearing investor than from an MBA-credentialed investor and 22.6% more likely to visit the CPA-bearing investor’s website.

Institutional investors appear to have selective preferences regarding corporate social responsibility. They appear indifferent to the presence of positive environmental (E) and social (S) indicators, but underweight stocks with negative ES indicators. This asymmetric pattern is particularly strong for longer-horizon institutions. Our empirical analyses indicate that this pattern is likely driven by economic incentives as the presence of negative ES indicators reflect downside risks: higher stock return skewness and probability of eventual bankruptcy and/or delisting. Positive ES indicators seem irrelevant in this context. Time-varying economic incentives also drive the dynamic pattern of institutional ownership of stocks with static negative indicators due to their controversial products (e.g., tobacco and firearms).

We develop a 10-K-based multidimensional measure of firm locations. Using this measure, we show that firm-level information is geographically distributed and institutional investors are able to exploit the resulting information asymmetry. Specifically, institutional investors overweigh firms whose 10-K frequently mentions the investors' state even when those firms are not headquartered locally and earn superior returns on those stocks. These ownership and performance patterns are stronger among hard-to-value firms. Local investor performance increases with the degree of local bias and with the local economic exposure of portfolio firms. Overall, geographical variation in firm-level information generates economically significant location-based information asymmetry.

Abstract We find that a corrupt local environment amplifies the effects of financial distress. Following regional spikes in financial misconduct, credit becomes more difficult to obtain for local borrowers—even those not implicated themselves. This is particularly harmful for cash-constrained firms, which cut investment more sharply and lay off more workers during industry downturns. We also find that local clustering of financial misconduct is a risk factor for bankruptcy.

Abstract Publicly listed firms respond to capital supply conditions shaped by local investing preferences. Public firms headquartered in areas with higher proportions of senior citizens and women use more debt financing. These demographics are associated with conservative investing, leading to a higher and more stable local supply of debt capital. The demographics–leverage relation is more pronounced for firms that cannot easily tap public bond markets, which is the majority of public firms. Changes in firms’ financing activities around exogenous shocks to credit supplies, including interstate banking deregulation and the 2008–2009 financial crisis, support the local capital supply hypothesis.

Abstract We examine whether bereavement affects managerial investment decisions in large organizations using the exogenous events of managers’ family deaths. We find evidence that bereaved managers take less risk in separate samples of mutual funds and publicly traded firms. Mutual funds managed by bereaved managers exhibit smaller tracking errors, lower active share measures, and higher portfolio weights on larger stocks after bereavement events. Firms managed by bereaved CEOs exhibit lower capital expenditures and fewer acquisitions after bereavement events. Further analyses support the emotion-driven explanation over other explanations. The risk shifting by bereaved managers has negative implications on the performance of funds and firms that they manage.