This short essay deals with universal banking in an environment in which a government safety net (for example deposit insurance) results in a moral hazard problem for banks. It argues that universal banking significantly exacerbates the problem. Specifically, universal banking extends the distortion of incentives caused by moral hazard to other sectors of the economy.

William Breen, John Boyd, Classroom Simulation as a Pedagogical Device in Teaching Money and Banking, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1976 Proceedings (Nov., 1976), pp. 595-606

In a recent issue of this Review (1983), William Shughart and Robert Tollison (S-T) hypothesize that the Fed pursues a bureaucratic objective which results in an in monetary policy. They test this hypothesis empirically and conclude that it is supported by the data. This comment, however, shows that their statistical procedures are flawed and when corrected provide little support for the inflationary bias theory. The data actually suggest a different, but not very interesting or surprising, interpretation.

This study examines common stock prices around ex-dividend dates. Such price data usually contain a mixture of observations—some with and some without arbitrageurs and/or dividend capturers active. Our theory predicts that such mixing will result in a nonlinear relation between percentage price drop and dividend yield—not the commonly assumed linear relation. This prediction and another important prediction of theory are supported empirically. In a variety of tests, marginal price drop is not significantly different from the dividend amount. Thus, over the last several decades, one-for-one marginal price drop has been an excellent (average) rule of thumb.

[This study examines common stock prices around ex-dividend dates. Such price data usually contain a mixture of observations--some with and some without arbitrageurs and/or dividend capturers active. Our theory predicts that such mixing will result in a nonlinear relation between percentage price drop and dividend yield--not the commonly assumed linear relation. This prediction and another important prediction of theory are supported empirically. In a variety of tests, marginal price drop is not significantly different from the dividend amount. Thus, over the last several decades, one-for-one marginal price drop has been an excellent (average) rule of thumb.]

We consider risk-neutral firms that must obtain external finance. They have access to two kinds of stochastic investment opportunities. For one, return realizations are costlessly observed by all agents. For the other, return realizations are costlessly observed only by the investing firm. We examine the optimal allocation of investment between the two projects and the optimal contract used to finance it. The optimal contractual outcome can be supported by appropriate (and determinate) quantities of debt and equity issues. Investments in projects with CSV problems are associated loosely with debt. Investments in projects with observable returns are associated with equity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, E51.