This paper extracts both the implied default recovery ratio and the risk-neutral default probability term structure for Russian Federation and Republic of Argentina US dollar Eurobonds during the 1998 Russian default crisis. This crisis provides a unique window into the impact of changing default probabilities and recovery ratio assumptions on credit-sensitive sovereign bond prices. For the Russian Eurobonds, the sample paths suggest a two-phase crisis revaluation. Shifts in default probabilities account for most of the initial price collapse. Marked decreases in the implied default recovery ratio dominate the second phase. Investors never cut their recovery value assumptions for Argentine debt.

This paper analyzes the correspondence between arbitrage sector pricing efficiency and the short-term hedging costs and effectiveness of futures contracts. Reversals of initial contract mispricings by arbitrage sector trading leads to an important mispricing retum component in the total retum to hedge portfolios. The existence of the mispricing retum has implications for initial hedge ratio selection, hedging effectiveness, and expected hedge retum. The analysis is used to interpret the hedge ratio guidance and performance of short-term hedges between the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index futures contract and the underlying S&P 500 cash stock index portfolio over the 1982-1986 period.

Empirical tests of Euler equations relating security returns and consumption usually appear to reject the model. Using a common specification of aggregate preferences and instrumental variables, this paper examines some potential reasons for rejections. The evidence indicates that maintained stationarity assumptions of previous tests fail for post-war U.S. quarterly and monthly data. Shifts in model parameters are found across policy regimes (pre-1951 and post-1979) and across stages of the business cycle (recession versus non-recession). Controlling for some of these factors, less evidence is found against a simple consumption-based asset pricing model in non-recession periods.

We study the dispersion of month-end valuations placed on identical corporate bonds by different mutual funds. Such dispersion is related to bond-specific characteristics associated with liquidity and market volatility. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) could have contributed to the general decline in dispersion over our sample period, though other factors most likely played roles. Further tests reveal marking patterns to be consistent with returns smoothing behavior by managers. Funds with ambiguous marking policies and those holding “hard-to-mark” bonds appear more prone to smooth reported returns. From a regulatory perspective, we see little downside to requiring funds to explicitly state their marking standards.

We find that small buy trades of US agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are priced 3–8% lower than large sell trades. No such “crossing” exists in corporate bonds and agency debentures. We attribute the MBS price patterns to impediments to position aggregation in combination with investor suitability rules that disproportionately affect retail-sized trading and show in a model that classic market frictions cannot produce crossing. Our findings imply that valuations placed on securities affected by aggregation and suitability frictions should adjust for position size. Such securities include not only agency MBS, but also asset-backed securities, commercial mortgage-backed securities, collateralized mortgage obligations, collateralized loan obligations, and private-label residential mortgage-backed securities.

We examine a fund manager's alleged manipulation of platinum and palladium futures settlement prices. Using benchmarks from parallel electronic markets, we find that the manager's market-on-close trading causes significant settlement price artificiality. Defying predictions that competition among floor traders should limit any artificiality, the artificiality increases in the second half of the alleged manipulation period. Between 35% and 52% of the latter-period artificiality is directly attributable to noncompetitive floor prices. Inflated floor volume contributes a similar proportion to artificiality via the exchange's trade-weighted settlement price formula. We estimate that floor counterparties reaped more than $6.0 million in excess profits.

Spain enacted a number of important debt management initiatives in 1997 to prepare its Treasury bond market for European Monetary Union. We interpret the impacts of these changes through shifts in a bond liquidity “life cycle” function. Furthermore, we highlight the importance of expected average future liquidity in explaining Spanish bond liquidity premiums. We also uncover pricing biases that support the Spanish Treasury’s tactical decision to target high-coupon, premium bonds in its pre-EMU debt exchanges. Finally, we show that EMU has been associated with both a decrease in bond yield volatility and an increase in pricing efficiency.