We analyze the risk and return characteristics across firms sorted by their environmental and social (ES) ratings. We document that ES ratings have no significant relation with average stock returns or unconditional market risk, and we provide evidence that these non-results are not due to low statistical power. Stocks of firms with higher ES ratings do have significantly lower systematic downside risk, as measured by downside beta, relative downside beta, coskewness, and tail risk beta. Nevertheless, the economic magnitude of such reduction in downside risk is small. Our results suggest that stock investors who derive non-pecuniary benefits from ES investing can engage in it without sacrificing financial performance.

Abstract We exploit heterogeneity in decreasing returns to scale (DRS) parameters across mutual funds to analyze the importance of scalability for investors’ capital allocation decisions. We find strong evidence that steeper DRS attenuate flow sensitivity to performance. We calibrate a rational model of active fund management and show that a large fraction of cross-sectional variation in assets-under-management is due to investors anticipating the effects of scale on return performance. We conclude that DRS play a key role in achieving equilibrium in the intermediated investment management market.

Abstract Individuals are constantly processing external information and translating it into actions. This draws on limited resources of attention and requires economizing on attention devoted to signals related to economic behaviour. A natural measure of such costs is based on Shannon’s “channel capacity”. Modelling economic agents as constrained by Shannon capacity as they process freely available information turns out to imply that discretely distributed actions, and thus actions that persist across repetitions of the same decision problem, are very likely to emerge in settings that without information costs would imply continuously distributed behaviour. We show how these results apply to the behaviour of an investor choosing portfolio allocations, as well as to some mathematically simpler “tracking” problems that illustrate the mechanism. Trying to use costs of adjustment to explain “stickiness” of actions when interpreting the behaviour in our economic examples would lead to mistaken conclusions.

Narcissism is a multifaceted personality trait that profoundly influences individuals' cognition, emotions, and actions. This study investigates the relationship between narcissistic CEOs and their engagement in opportunistic insider trading. Utilizing a quantitative measure of CEOs' narcissism derived from textual analysis, we find that CEOs with a higher level of narcissism engage in opportunistic insider trading more intensely. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we employ various rigorous approaches, including matching, instrumental variable, Heckman's two-step sample selection model, and falsification tests. Through cross-sectional analysis, we find that the impact of CEOs' narcissism on opportunistic insider trading is more pronounced among CEOs with limited legal knowledge, facing weaker external and internal monitoring pressure, working at larger firms, and being male. In addition, we demonstrate that the insider trades of narcissistic CEOs are less profitable and less informative than those of non-narcissistic CEOs, as evidenced by subsequent stock performance.