Small business lending (SBL) plays an important role in funding productive investment and fostering local economic growth. Recently, nonbank lenders have gained market share in the SBL market in the United States, especially relative to community banks. Among nonbanks, fintech lenders have become particularly active, leveraging alternative data and complex modeling for their own internal credit scoring. We use proprietary loan-level data from two fintech SBL platforms (Funding Circle and LendingClub) to explore the characteristics of loans originated pre-pandemic (20162019). Our results show that these fintech SBL platforms lent relatively more in zip codes with higher unemployment rates and higher business bankruptcy filings. Moreover, fintech platforms’ internal credit scores were able to predict future loan performance more accurately than traditional credit scores, particularly in areas with high unemployment. Using Y-14 M loan-level bank data, we compare fintech SBL with traditional bank business cards in terms of credit access and interest rates. Overall, while not all fintech firms follow the same approach, we find that fintech lenders could help close the credit gap, allowing small businesses that were less likely to receive credit through traditional lenders to access credit and potentially at lower cost.

Fintech and big tech companies are making rapid inroads into credit markets. We hand construct a global database of fintech and big tech lending volumes for 79 countries over 2013–2018. Using a panel regression analysis, we find these new forms of digital lending are larger in countries with higher GDP per capita (albeit at a declining rate), where banking sector mark-ups are higher, and where banking regulation is less stringent. We also find that these alternative forms of credit are more developed where the ease of doing business is greater, investor protection disclosure and the efficiency of the judicial system are more advanced, and where bond and equity markets are more developed. Overall, fintech and big tech credit seem to complement other forms of credit, rather than substitute for them.

Central banks can operate with negative equity, and many have done so in history without undermining trust in fiat money. However, there are limits. How negative can central bank equity be before fiat money loses credibility? We address this question using a global game approach motivated by the fall of the Bank of Amsterdam (1609–1820). We solve for the unique break point where negative equity and asset illiquidity render fiat money worthless. We draw lessons on the role of fiscal support and central bank capital in sustaining trust in fiat money.