The efficiency wage model (EWM) has been advanced as an explanation for large and persistent wage differentials. The shirking version of the EWM assumes a trade-off between self-supervision and external supervision. The turnover version assumes turnover is costly to the firm. Variation across firms in the cost of monitoring/shirking or turnover then is hypothesized to account for wage variations across firms for homogeneous workers. Using a new sample of firm data, this paper presents empirical evidence of the trade-off of wage premiums for supervisory intensity and turnover. Little evidence is found to support either version of the EWM.

Affirmative action may be broadly conceived of as pursuing either the goal of reducing discrimination or that of redistributing jobs and earnings. I attempt to infer the ends of affirmative action policy by analyzing the historical record of enforcement. Optimal enforcement strategies are developed for both the antidiscrimination and the earnings redistribution models and then compared with new data on the actual targeting of affirmative action compliance reviews during the late 1970s. I find that establishments with very low proportions of minority or female workers are not significantly more likely to be reviewed, but that white-collar-intensive establishments are more likely to be reviewed. This indicates the shortcomings of the antidiscrimination model in explaining the OFCCP's behavior and suggests the potential usefulness of the earnings redistribution model.

Affirmative action under Executive Order 11246 ranks among the most controversial of domestic federal policies. This study asks whether affirmative action has been successful in promoting the employment of minorities and females. It compares the change in demographics between 1974 and 1980 at more than sixty-eight thousand establishments, and finds that both minority and female employment have increased faster at establishments subject to affirmative action. Compliance reviews, while not well targeted are also found to have been effective.

Using a new set of directly observed wage expectations among firms, this paper finds that in general firms' forecasts fail the unbiasedness and efficiency requirements of weak-form rational expectations. These market participants consistently underestimate the wages they actually end up paying, and their expectations do not efficiently utilize the information in past realizations. The mean absolute forecast error of two percent compares with an error of only five percent if static expectations were held. The major source of wage fore-cast error seems to be errors in predicting demand, rather than in predicting supply or the general price level. Wage forecast errors are positively correlated across fields with distinct supply patterns, and are positively correlated with quantity forecast error. The properties of stochastically weighted expectations and the effectiveness of the wage and price controls of the early 1970's are also discussed.