We study merger and acquisition (M&A) disclosures made during regularly scheduled earnings calls. These bundled disclosures have been understudied in the literature, which focuses on dedicated M&A calls. Bundled deals represent an economically significant share of merger transactions. Bundling occurs when earnings news is weak. Bundled disclosures produce lower announcement returns by ∼130 basis points and are associated with reduced investor attention relative to dedicated calls. Bundling is more likely when bidders suffer from agency problems, such as powerful CEOs, entrenched boards, and low institutional ownership. In bundled calls, managers discuss the transaction in an optimistic tone that contrasts with the negative tone of the rest of the call. Overall, bundling seems to be an opportunistic attempt to put a positive spin on earnings news, to which analysts respond with skepticism. Our paper contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosure and contains important practical lessons for managers, board members, and market participants.

Horizontal directors, board members who also hold board seats in same-industry peers, are common in U.S. corporations. We posit that horizontal directorships can enhance the efficiency of corporate investment decisions. Horizontal directors enjoy access to current information flows, which help boards fulfill their roles of advising and monitoring – a form of learning from peers. We find that horizontal directorships are negatively related to investment inefficiency, and with over-investment in particular. Exogenous shocks to board composition provide a causal interpretation to our findings. Our paper contributes to a nuanced view of horizontal directors by highlighting their contribution to mitigate excessive investment.