Economists have long recognized that investors care differently about downside losses versus upside gains. Agents who place greater weight on downside risk demand additional compensation for holding stocks with high sensitivities to downside market movements. We show that the cross section of stock returns reflects a downside risk premium of approximately 6% per annum. Stocks that covary strongly with the market during market declines have high average returns. The reward for beasring downside risk is not simply compensation for regular market beta, nor is it explained by coskewness or liquidity risk, or by size, value, and momentum characteristics.

We characterize optimal mutual fund risk-taking strategies in competitive multi-period tournaments among multiple players. With multiple competitors, every player begins by taking maximum risk. In the final period, all players continue to take maximum risk except the leading player, who employs a “lock-in” strategy that depends on the magnitude of the lead. Our theory predicts the leader should strategically lock in advantage by reducing risk-taking if and only if the lead is great enough, rather than an increase in risk-taking by the trailers to try to catch up. Empirical evidence from style-adjusted mutual fund tournaments provides strong and robust support.

Correlations between U.S. stocks and the aggregate U.S. market are much greater for downside moves, especially for extreme downside moves, than for upside moves. We develop a new statistic for measuring, comparing, and testing asymmetries in conditional correlations. Conditional on the downside, correlations in the data differ from the conditional correlations implied by a normal distribution by 11.6%. We find that conditional asymmetric correlations are fundamentally different from other measures of asymmetries, such as skewness and co-skewness. We find that small stocks, value stocks, and past loser stocks have more asymmetric movements. Controlling for size, we find that stocks with lower betas exhibit greater correlation asymmetries, and we find no relationship between leverage and correlation asymmetries. Correlation asymmetries in the data reject the null hypothesis of multivariate normal distributions at daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies. However, several empirical models with greater flexibility, particularly regime-switching models, perform better at capturing correlation asymmetries.

We develop a stock market model with differences of opinion and short-sales constraints. When breadth is low—i.e., when few investors have long positions—this signals that the short-sales constraint is binding tightly, and that prices are high relative to fundamentals. Thus reductions in breadth should forecast lower returns. Using data on mutual fund holdings, we find that stocks whose change in breadth in the prior quarter is in the lowest decile of the sample underperform those in the top decile by 6.38% in the twelve months after formation. Adjusting for size, book-to-market, and momentum, the figure is 4.95%.

We develop a series of cross-sectional regression specifications to forecast skewness in the daily returns of individual stocks. Negative skewness is most pronounced in stocks that have experienced (1) an increase in trading volume relative to trend over the prior six months, consistent with the model of Hong and Stein (NBER Working Paper, 1999), and (2) positive returns over the prior 36 months, which fits with a number of theories, most notably Blanchard and Watson's (Crises in Economic and Financial Structure. Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1982, pp. 295–315) rendition of stock-price bubbles. Analogous results also obtain when we attempt to forecast the skewness of the aggregate stock market, though our statistical power in this case is limited.

Economists have long recognized that investors care differently about downside losses versus upside gains. Agents who place greater weight on downside risk demand additional compensation for holding stocks with high sensitivities to downside market movements. We show that the cross section of stock returns reflects a downside risk premium of approximately 6% per annum. Stocks that covary strongly with the market during market declines have high average returns. The reward for beasring downside risk is not simply compensation for regular market beta, nor is it explained by coskewness or liquidity risk, or by size, value, and momentum characteristics. (JEL C12, C15, C32, G12) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

We investigate the effect of scale on performance in the active money management industry. We first document that fund returns, both before and after fees and expenses, decline with lagged fund size, even after accounting for various performance benchmarks. We then explore a number of potential explanations for this relationship. This association is most pronounced among funds that have to invest in small and illiquid stocks, suggesting that these adverse scale effects are related to liquidity. Controlling for its size, a fund's return does not deteriorate with the size of the family that it belongs to, indicating that scale need not be bad for performance depending on how the fund is organized. Finally, using data on whether funds are solo-managed or team-managed and the composition of fund investments, we explore the idea that scale erodes fund performance because of the interaction of liquidity and organizational diseconomies.

ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of managerial outsourcing on the performance and incentives of mutual funds. Fund families outsource the management of a large fraction of their funds to advisory firms. These funds underperform those run internally by about 52 basis points per year. After instrumenting for a fund's outsourcing status, the estimated underperformance is three times larger. We hypothesize that contractual externalities due to firm boundaries make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourced relationship. Consistent with this view, outsourced funds face higher powered incentives; they are more likely to be closed after poor performance and excessive risk‐taking.