[This paper models the effect of information on security prices when there is uncertainty regarding the precision of information. When uncertainty regarding precision is allowed, price response to information is neither linear nor even necessarily monotonic, because the market revises its expectation regarding the precision based on the signal realization. When the underlying information structure is conditionally multivariate normal, the price response (return) is nonlinear with the average response (response per unit of surprise) declining in the absolute magnitude of surprise. This nonlinearity occurs because the market associates lower precision with extreme news. When the precision is distributed in the form of a gamma, the returns function is unimodal in each quadrant ("S-shaped") and negatively sloped at the extremes. The extent of nonlinearity increases in the ex ante uncertainty regarding both the asset value and the precision of information.]

This paper examines if the stock market prices discretionary accruals. Evidence reveals that, on average, the market attaches value to discretionary accruals. This evidence is consistent with two alternative scenarios: (1) managerial discretion improves the ability of earnings to reflect economic value, and (2) discretionary accruals are opportunistic and value-irrelevant but priced by an inefficient market. Further evidence is consistent with the former explanation. There is evidence of pervasive income smoothing, which improves the persistence and predictability of reported earnings. There is also evidence that discretionary accruals predict future profitability and dividend changes. Despite several sensitivity checks, measurement error in the discretionary accruals proxy is an alternative explanation for the results.

Presents a stylized model of the effect of information on security prices when there is uncertainty regarding the precision of information. Uncertain precision; Rational expectation models; Earnings-returns relation; Nonlinearity.

We model a two‐period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the “true” earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms.

With the exception of financial firms, we find no evidence that comprehensive income is more strongly associated with returns/market value or better predicts future cash flows/income than net income. Moreover, the only component of comprehensive income that improves the association between income and returns is the marketable securities adjustment. Our results do not support the claim that comprehensive income is a better measure of firm performance than net income. Our results also raise questions about the appropriateness of items included in SFAS 130 comprehensive income as well as the need for mandating uniform comprehensive income disclosures for all industries.

We examine 12-month returns following disclosure of first-time going concern (GC) opinions in the U.S. and Australia. We find no evidence of significant negative abnormal returns associated with GC opinions in Australia. In the U.S., negative abnormal returns subsequent to GC opinions are sensitive to choice of expected returns—notably, there are no significant negative abnormal returns when using factor models or after controlling for momentum. Overall, contrary to Taffler, Lu, Kausar's [2004. In denial? Stock market underreaction to going-concern audit report disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 38, 263–285.] U.K. results, we are unable to document a market anomaly in the U.S. or Australia associated with GC opinions.

In a sample of auditor change firms we find that discretionary accruals are income decreasing during the last year with the predecessor auditor and generally insignificant during the first year with the successor. In addition, the income decreasing discretionary accruals are concentrated among firms expected to have greater litigation risk. These findings are consistent with litigation risk concerns providing incentives for auditors to prefer conservative accounting choices, and with managers dismissing incumbent auditors in the hope of finding a more reasonable successor. However, we cannot rule out financial distress as a potential alternative explanation for our results.

Valuation theory recognizes that the relation between earnings innovations and changes in security valuation is increasing in the persistence of the earnings innovations. Analyses in this article reveal that the present value of revisions in expected future benefits is a function of the length of revision horizon, suggesting that earnings persistence is determined, in part, by an entity's going‐concern status. These analyses predict an inverse relation between earnings informativeness and an entity's probability of termination. Drawing on a sample of quarterly earnings and returns data from more than 1,500 distinct firms for the period 1981–1990, a statistically significant inverse relation is documented between an entity's probability of termination and the informativeness of earnings—the latter measured as the coefficient from a regression of returns on earnings. Further empirical analyses reveal that this result is a pervasive economic phenomenon not attributable to extreme conditions or other prevailing explanations of earnings informativeness. This inference is robust to variations in research design, including measurement of earnings informativeness and of termination probability and alternative specifications of the relation between returns and earnings. Consequently, the evidence in this article is consistent with a fundamental role for an entity's going‐concern status in determining the usefulness of earnings. Résumé. La théorie de l'évaluation reconnaît le fait que la relation entre les nouvelles informations relatives au bénéfice net et les changements dans l'évaluation des titres s'intensifie lorsque persistent lesdites informations. Les analyses réalisées par les auteurs révèlent que la valeur actualisée des rajustements dans les gains futurs espérés dépend de l'horizon du rajustement, ce qui donne à penser que la persistance du bénéfice net est en partie fonction de la continuité de l'exploitation de l'entreprise. Selon ces analyses, le potentiel informatif du bénéfice net devrait être en relation inverse avec la probabilité de fermeture de l'entité. En s'appuyant sur un échantillon de données trimestrielles relatives au bénéfice net et au rendement recueillies auprès de plus de 1500 entreprises distinctes pour la période 1981–1990, les auteurs observent une relation inverse statistiquement significative entre la probabilité de fermeture d'une entité et le potentiel informatif du bénéfice—ce dernier étant mesuré sous forme de coefficient, au moyen d'une régression des rendements sur les bénéfices. D'autres analyses empiriques révèlent que cette conclusion est un phénomène économique répandu qui n'est pas attribuable à des conditions extrêmes ou à d'autres explications prédominantes du potentiel informatif du bénéfice net. Cette inference résiste aux variations dans le plan de recherche, y compris la mesure du potentiel informatif du bénéfice net et de la probabilité de fermeture, et les autres caractéristiques possibles de la relation entre le rendement et le bénéfice. Les résultats obtenus confirment donc que la continuité de l'exploitation joue un rôle fondamental dans la détermination de l'utilité du bénéfice net.