Adequate disclosure of risks and uncertainties is an issue of interest to the accounting profession and regulators both in Canada and in the United States. Previously, auditors were required to modify their audit reports in the presence of material uncertainties. However, following suggestions that such disclosure is redundant and not useful, the CICA removed this requirement in 1980. Auditors in the United States are still required to disclose material uncertainties in the audit report. The criterion of predictive ability is used in this research to evaluate the potential usefulness of this report modification requirement. Specifically, the study examines the ability of report modifications to predict the materially adverse resolutions of pending litigation. The subsequent resolution patterns for a sample of litigation loss contingencies (with an audit report modification) and a control sample of litigation loss contingencies (without an audit report modification) were compared. The results indicate that a larger proportion of contingencies with an audit report modification were resolved materially against the client. Also noteworthy, audit report modifications had incremental predictive ability over other types of disclosures such as footnotes to the financial statements and prior media disclosure of the contingency. Résumé. La présentation adéquate des risques et des incertitudes est une question d'intérêt pour la profession comptable et les responsables de la réglementation, tant au Canada qu'aux États‐Unis. Les vérificateurs étaient auparavant tenus de modifier leur rapport en cas d'incertitudes importantes. Toutefois, à la suite de suggestions selon lesquelles cette information était redondante et sans véritable utilité, l'I.C.C.A. a supprimé cette exigence en 1980. Aux États‐Unis, les vérificateurs sont encore tenus de prvérificateurssenter les incertitudes importantes dans leurs rapports. L'auteur utilise le critère de la capacité de prédiction pour évaluer l'utilité potentielle de cette demande de modification du rapport des vérificateurs. Il examine plus précisément dans quelle mesure les modifications apportées au rapport permettent de pédire si les litiges en instance auront un dénouement défavorable dont les conséquences seront importantes. Les modèles de dénouement ultérieur d'un échantillon de pertes éentuelles attribuantes à des litiges, avec modification du rapport des vérificateurs, et d'un échantillon de contrôle de pertes éventuelles attribuables à des litiges, sans modification du rapport des vérificateurs, ont été comparés. Les résultats de cette comparaison indiquent qu'une plus grande proportion de pertes éventuelles attribuables à des litiges avec modification du rapport des vérificateurs se sont soldées par un résultat défavorable important pour le client. Autre fait digne de mention: les modifications apportées au rapport des vérificateurs présentaient une capacité de prédiction marginale par rapport aux autres types d'information tels que les notes afférentes aux états financiers et la diffusion préalable par les médias des pertes éventuelles.

This paper examines the probability judgments made by auditors for their financial statement footnote disclosure decisions and their audit report additional paragraph decisions in the presence of material loss contingencies. In the United States these judgments are governed by SFAS No. 5 and SAS No. 58. Two prior studies have reported inconsistent results pertaining to the degree of compliance of auditors with the judgment and decision‐making process implied by SFAS No. 5. In contrast, SAS No. 58 has not previously been examined with respect to auditor compliance. Results from an experiment with 64 audit partners from six firms were consistent with the hypothesis that audit partners employ the same (compensatory) judgment process when making footnote disclosure decisions as when making additional paragraph decisions. This process led the partners to make judgments for the additional paragraph decision that were in accordance with SAS No. 58. In contrast, their judgments for the footnote disclosure decision were consistent with a decision theory model of auditor behavior rather than the noncompensatory process implied by SFAS No. 5. Additional aspects of the study pertain to the additional paragraph decision of auditors. Observed judgments for these decisions are consistent with the hypothesis that additional information is conveyed beyond that provided by only a footnote disclosure. This is contrary to some recent discussions of the standards. Résumé. Les auteurs étudient les jugements relatifs aux probabilités portés par les vérificateurs dans le cadre de leurs décisions relatives à la présentation des pertes éventuelles importantes sous forme de notes infrapaginales dans les états financiers ou de paragraphes supplémentaires dans le rapport des vérificateurs. Aux États‐Unis, ces jugements sont régis par le SFAS n o 5 et le SAS n o 58. Deux études antérieures ont donné des résultats dissemblables en ce qui a trait à la mesure dans laquelle les vérificateurs se conforment au processus de jugement et de prise de décisions que suppose le SFAS n o 5. Le respect par les vérificateurs des normes du SAS n o 58 n'a fait, quant à lui, l'objet d'aucune analyse. Les résultats d'une expérience menée auprès de 64 associés reponsables de la vérification dans six cabinets ont confirmé l'hypothèse selon laquelle les associés responsables de la vérification utilisent le même processus de jugement (compensatoire) lorsqu'ils décident de présenter les pertes éventuelles sous forme de notes infrapaginales que lorsqu'ils optent pour les paragraphes supplémentaires. Ce processus a amené les associés à porter des jugements pour l'ajout de paragraphes supplémentaires conformes au SAS n o 58. Par opposition, leurs jugements relatifs à la présentation sous forme de notes infrapaginales étaient conformes à un modèle de comportement du vérificateur inspiré de la théorie de la décision plutôt qu'au processus non compensatoire que suppose le SFAS n o 5. D'autres aspects de l'étude portent sur la décision des vérificateurs relative à l'ajout de paragraphes supplémentaires. Les jugements observés relativement à cette décision sont conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle d'autres renseignements sont transmis, outre ceux qui sont fournis par voie de simples notes infrapaginales. Ces résultats viennent contredire certaines analyses récentes portant sur les normes.

In this study we investigate whether the characteristics of clients, auditors, and the auditor‐client relationship simultaneously determine audit and non‐audit fees. As done in prior studies, we maintain that fees proxy for the level of service provided and follow the physical flow of knowledge. Estimating single‐equation models of audit and non‐audit fee models, we confirm prior findings of an association between audit and non‐audit fees. Studies conclude that such evidence is consistent with knowledge spillovers between the two services. However, we document empirically that audit and non‐audit fees are simultaneously determined. Because the data indicate audit and non‐audit fees are jointly determined, we then investigate whether previously documented associations between audit and non‐audit fees are the result of biased estimation induced by using endogenous variables in single‐equation models. In contrast to results from single‐equation estimations, we find no association between audit and non‐audit fees using a simultaneous specification of the fee system, suggesting that single‐equation estimations suffer from simultaneous‐equations bias. In sum, the findings are not consistent with the existence of economies of scope from the joint performance of audit and non‐audit services after controlling for the joint behavior of audit and non‐audit fees. Given the ongoing debate over the level of allowed non‐audit services by auditors, the argument for the joint provision of audit and non‐audit services is less justified than if joint‐supply benefits had been documented.

We find no significant association between non–audit service fees and impaired auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by auditors’ propensity to issue going concern audit opinions. We also find no association between going concern opinions and either total fees or audit fees. In addition, our findings are robust to controlling for unexpected fees, to controlling for endogeneity among our variables, and to several alternative research design specifications. Our results are consistent with market–based incentives, such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, dominating the expected benefits from compromising auditor independence.

ABSTRACT After restating their financial statements, companies may voluntarily restate their previously issued internal control (IC) reports for the financial statement (FS) misstatement periods, changing them from “effective” to “ineffective.” This paper examines the determinants and consequences of IC restatements, which have been of concern to financial statement users. When announcing these IC restatements, companies often provide a detailed explanation of the IC problems and a discussion of their plans to remediate these problems. We find that companies with less severe IC problems that can be remediated more quickly are more likely to restate their IC reports. Moreover, these results are driven by companies with a higher need for external financing, suggesting that IC restaters voluntarily restate their IC reports in order to inform investors about their less severe IC material weaknesses and their plans to improve IC quality. Finally, we find that, relative to other FS restatement companies, IC restaters have a lower likelihood of CFO turnover and auditor resignation following the FS restatement. Taken together, our results suggest that voluntary IC restatements are used by IC restaters as a means to separate themselves from other FS restatement companies with more severe control problems and slower remediation plans. Our findings also indicate that studies investigating IC quality and related disclosures need to distinguish between IC restaters and other FS restatement companies because of the different characteristics and consequences between the two groups.

This study examines the association between audit committee characteristics and the ratio of nonaudit service (NAS) fees to audit fees, using data gathered under the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) fee disclosure rules. Issues related to NAS fees have been of concern to practitioners, regulators, and academics for a number of years. Prior research suggests that audit committees possessing certain characteristics are important participants in the process of managing the client‐auditor relationship. We hypothesize that audit committees that are independent and active financial monitors have incentives to limit NAS fees (relative to audit fees) paid to incumbent auditors, in an effort to enhance auditor independence in either appearance or fact. Our analysis using a sample of 538 firms indicates that audit committees comprised solely of independent directors meeting at least four times annually are significantly and negatively associated with the NAS fee ratio. This evidence is consistent with audit committee members perceiving a high level of NAS fees in a negative light and taking actions to decrease the NAS fee ratio.

ABSTRACT The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP), formed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has recommended that all public companies be required to have shareholder ratification of auditor selection. Using data from 1,382 firms for the year ending December 31, 2006, we find that audit fees are higher in firms with shareholder voting on auditor ratification. We also find that firms that started having a shareholder vote pay higher fees than firms that stopped having a shareholder vote. In the second part of our study, we find that in firms with shareholder voting on auditor selection (1) subsequent restatements are less likely and (2) abnormal accruals are lower. Our findings are consistent with the experimental results in Mayhew and Pike (2004), and provide empirical grounding for the debate about mandating shareholder voting on auditor selection.

We examine the association between cost of equity and internal control weakness (ICW) for firms that filed first-time Section 404 reports with the SEC. Using several proxies, we find higher implied cost of equity associated with ICW firms than for a control sample of firms that disclosed no ICW. However, the higher cost of equity associated with ICW disappears after controlling for primitive firm characteristics and for analyst forecast bias. Overall, we find that, on average, ICWs are not directly associated with higher cost of equity.

ABSTRACT Issues related to low-balling of initial year audit fees and the resultant impact on audit quality have received significant attention from regulators in many countries. Using 9,684 observations from China during the years 2002–2011, we find that there is a significant initial year audit fee discount following an audit firm change when both of the signing audit partners are different from the prior year. The evidence is mixed if one or both of the signing partners from the prior year also moves with the client to the new audit firm. We find evidence of audit fee discounting in our analysis of fee levels, but not in our analysis of changes in audit fees from the prior year. Sanctions for problem audits and greater earnings management are more likely when there is an audit firm change that involves two new signing partners together with initial year audit fee discounting.