We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as too-big-to-fail (TBTF) or systemically important (SIFI). Using secondary market subordinated debt transactions we find that the size discount is reduced by 47% and TBTF discount is reduced by 94% after the DFA. The DFA has been effective in reducing, but not in eliminating the size and TBTF discounts on yield spreads. Market discipline of banks appears to have improved further after the rating criteria changes by Moody’s.

The default risk sensitivity of yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) decreased after banks started issuing trust-preferred securities (TPS). The too-big-to-fail (TBTF) discount on yield spreads is absent prior to the LTCM bailout, but the size discount doubles after the LTCM bailout. Prior to TPS issuance and the LTCM bailout, SND yield spreads are sensitive to conventional firm-specific default risk measures, but not after the bailout. We find paradigm shift in determinants of yield spreads after the LTCM bailout. Yield spreads on TPS are sensitive to default risks and can provide an additional source of market discipline.

We study the determinants of bank growth in a two-stage logistic regression model. We first compare banks that branch, Bank Acquire, or Product Expand with banks that do not grow externally. Banks that are federally chartered, in states with higher income growth, and with higher labor prices are less likely to grow externally. Larger banks are more likely to grow externally. In the second stage, we study determinants of growth activity for banks that expand products, branch, or acquire other banks. Depending on the time period, bank structure, regulatory environment, performance, and balance sheet characteristics determine bank growth choices.

Because big banks could impact competition in rural markets, we investigate the effects of big-bank presence on the performance of rural, small banks. When competing against a big bank, rural one-county banks operate at lower levels of proit efficiency, but with higher ROA and increased levels of interest and fee income from loans. Lower profit efficiency and higher returns in the rural markets suggest that big banks possess market power in rural markets and that they can extract rents to earn higher returns with lower than average profit efficiency. Therefore, small banks in rural markets should not fear large competitors. Conversely, customers who rely on loans from rural, small banks are negatively impacted by higher rates and fees on loans when a big bank is present in the market.

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.

Longstaff [Longstaff, F., 2000. The term structure of very short-term rates: new evidence for the expectations hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 397–415] finds support for the expectations hypothesis at the very short end of the repurchase agreement (repo) term structure while other studies find calendar-time-based regularities cause rejection of the expectations hypothesis. Using Longstaff’s methods on a sample of repo rates that pre-dates Longstaff’s sample, we reject the expectations hypothesis for every maturity. The pre-Longstaff-sample repo data comes from a time period where the behavior of short-term interest rates is similar to the long-run average behavior of short-term interest rates. Our results imply that expectations hold when rates are less volatile and/or that we may be entering a period of lower volatility.