I examine an action hedge fund managers take to increase their assets under management: selling ownership stakes in their firms to outside owners. Fund companies that sell stakes to outside owners open more new funds and attract higher fund flows. The flow impact is greater for funds who sell stakes to more reputable outside owners and outsiders with asset management divisions. Funds with outside owners do not subsequently outperform their peers. Despite the lack of subsequent outperformance, fund investors do benefit from a reduction in returns management and lower incidence of fraud. Taken together, my results indicate that these transactions result in synergies for all parties involved.

Abstract We analyze changes to mutual funds’ self-declared benchmarks using hand-collected data from funds’ prospectuses. Under existing rules, funds can freely change their benchmark indexes and, implicitly, the historical returns to which they compare their past performance. Funds exploit this loophole by adding (dropping) indexes with lower (higher) past returns, thereby materially improving the appearance of their benchmark-adjusted returns. High-fee funds, broker-sold funds, and funds experiencing poor performance and outflows are more likely to engage in this behavior. These funds subsequently attract additional flows despite continuing to underperform their peers.

Many US states have a single cutoff date for school entry, meaning that some children are older than others when they begin kindergarten. We show that this variation in birth months is associated with differences in adult labor market outcomes in the mutual fund industry. Relatively older managers (i.e., those born just after the cutoff) make better stock selections, and their funds outperform their younger peers’ funds by 0.48% per annum. This difference is linked to increased confidence. Survey respondents judge relatively older managers as appearing more confident in photographs, and these managers display more confident behavior: making larger bets, window dressing their holdings less, and securing more fund flows conditional on performance.

We show that hedge funds gain an information advantage from their prime broker banks regarding the banks’ corporate borrowers. The connected hedge funds make abnormally large trades in the stocks of borrowing firms prior to loan announcements, and these trades outperform other trades. The outperformance is particularly strong for trades of hedge funds that have high revenue potential for prime broker banks. These informed trades appear to be based on information not just about the loan itself but also about firms’ fundamentals such as future earnings. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that equity analysts inside the banks are one potential conduit of information transfer.

ABSTRACT We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.