We analyze whether bank familiarity affects depositor behavior during financial crisis. Familiarity is measured by regional or local cues in the bank’s name. Depositor behavior is measured by the depositor’s sensitivity to observable bank risk (depositor discipline). Using 2001–2010 bank-level and region-level data for Russia, we find that depositors of familiar banks become less sensitive to bank risk during a financial crisis relative to depositors of unfamiliar banks. To validate that our results stem from a flight to familiarity during crisis and not from implicit guarantees from regional governments, we split our sample along the lines of regional affinity and trust in local governments. The flight to familiarity effect is strongly confirmed in the subsample of regions with strong regional affinity, while the effect is absent in the subsample of regions with more trust in regional and local governments, lending support to the thesis that our results are driven by a flight to familiarity rather than by implicit guarantees.

We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician's party is currently in power – less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to leave with them.

In this paper, we consider how the intensity and channels of the relation between social networks and bank loyalty vary according to the state of the economy. We analyze bank exit over the period 2005–2012 for over 300,000 retail clients of a commercial bank that experienced a bank run in 2008 due to a shock in solvency risk. The unique and rich data we constructed in close collaboration with the bank enables us to distinguish different sorts of family networks from neighborhood networks, while controlling for a wide range of client-level and branch-level characteristics and events. Using a proportional hazards model, we show the importance of family networks. In times of financial distress, family networks become even more important and retail clients take weaker, less direct social relationships into account.

We compare the investment activities and sources of finance of venture capital (VC) funds in Germany, Israel, Japan and the United Kingdom. VC investments differ across countries in terms of their stage, sector and geographical focus. Sources of VC funds also differ across countries; for example, banks are particularly important in Germany and Japan, corporations in Israel, and pension funds in the United Kingdom. Although the differences in investments are related to funding sources—for example, bank and pension fund-backed VCs invest in later stage activities than individual and corporate backed funds—a large proportion of variation within as well as between countries is unrelated to sources of finance. Moreover, differences in the relation between funding source and VC activity are unrelated to the country's financial systems. We conclude that neither financial systems nor sources of finance are the main explanations for the pronounced differences in VC activities.

We contribute to the financial constraints literature and the investment-cash flow sensitivity debate by defining a new and simple index of firm level financial constraints for unquoted European SMEs. Firms that are constrained according to our index pay higher interest rates on their debt. An exogenous financial supply shock reveals that our index also captures financial constraints in terms of the volume of credit. Our index outperforms existing indices in capturing financial constraints of unquoted SMEs. Finally, employing our proposed index to identify financially constrained firms and using firm-level employment growth as a control for investment opportunities, we find that constrained firms display the highest investment-cash flow sensitivities.