The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was designed by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to inject emergency short-term funds into banks, as a supplement to the lender of last resort discount window offerings. We describe how the Federal Reserve altered the design of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) over the course of the financial crisis and examine the utilization of this stand-alone facility. Most specifically we detail the impact of the greatly increased offering amounts in all auctions after October 2008, which resulted in the facility no longer auctioning scarcely available funds. We also document significantly different usage of the facility by FDIC-insured community and non-community banks, consistent with the notion of a two-tiered banking system in the U.S. Community banks were far less likely to use the facility than larger, non-community banks.

We examine how community banks respond to liquidity shocks created by natural disasters. We address community banks’ responses to liquidity shocks due to their focused geographic and economic presence, which coincide with their communities’ exposure to the disasters and the ability of the local banks to meet their needs. We find that community banks respond to liquidity shocks by managing their balance sheet, rather than any single balance sheet account. In particular, we find that they respond to the liquidity needs of their communities by increasing loans as deposits are withdrawn.

From the inception of money market funds (MMFs), all MMFs reported a fixed $1 NAV (Net Asset Value). In July 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued new regulations for MMFs that require Prime institutional MMFs to report floating NAVs. The SEC did not expect a significant impact on the MMF industry from requiring floating NAVs for Prime institutional funds. We find that over 70% of the assets under management in Prime MMFs left Prime funds with over half the Prime funds closing. We find that more than half of the Prime retail MMFs (which are not required to switch to floating NAV) closed with more than 50% of the assets under management exiting these funds. Finally, we find that for every dollar that exited Prime MMFs a dollar was added to Government MMFs. Based on the SEC's economic discussions, these results all represent unexpected consequences.