Abstract Using euro conversion as the trigger, we examine what drives volume and spread changes when stock exchanges compete. Results show average trading costs on European exchanges decrease almost 9%, and turnover increases over 30%. Trading costs decline or remain unchanged on all exchanges, but volume deteriorates in some markets and improves in others. Frankfurt, Paris, London, and Milan are winners, while Madrid and Brussels lose volume. We examine the role of the spread-volume relation, firm characteristics, exchange trading rules, and country-level factors in determining these outcomes. Results suggest that euro conversion prompted competition by increasing transparency in market prices.

Decomposing the year-to-year changes in the earnings distribution from 2004 to 2013, we analyze the role of the employer in explaining earnings inequality in the United States. Movements between the bottom, middle, and top involve 20.5 million workers each year. Another 19.9 million move between employment and nonemployment. There are large gains from working at a top-paying firm for all skill types. Working for a high-paying firm produces benefits today, through higher earnings, that persist through an increase in the probability of upward mobility. High-paying firms facilitate moving workers to the top of the distribution and keeping them there.

This paper analyzes changes in shareholder value and firm performance in relation to the delay (or lack thereof) in CEO succession. I find that, on average, delay in succession is associated with stronger performance after an unplanned CEO departure. However, the value effect of delay varies and not all firms benefit from long delay. Firms with higher stock price volatility and those whose CEO is hired away experience lower performance. These results suggest that delay affects frictions in the CEO labor market. The impact of delay is particularly important when firms have no succession plan in place.

Abstract We find that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) actions (especially rate cuts) narrowed corporate credit spreads during the pre-crisis period of 2002–07. During the 2008 crisis period, we find that both conventional cuts and quantitative easing decreased spreads. But FOMC inactions caused significant widening of spreads. The effects are especially large for speculative-grade and short-maturity bonds. Overall, the policy uncertainty during the crisis and macroeconomic theories during the pre-crisis period help to explain why FOMC announcements impacted credit spreads. The Fed’s actions targeted at promoting growth and/or providing systemic liquidity were especially noted by the corporate bond market.

Being hired into a job depends not only on one’s own skill but also on that of other applicants. When another able applicant applies, a well-suited worker may be forced into unemployment or into accepting an inferior job. A model of this process defines over- and underqualification and provides predictions on its prevalence and on the wages of mismatched workers. It also implies that unemployment is concentrated among the least skilled workers, while vacancies are concentrated among high-skilled jobs. Four data sets are used to confirm the implications and establish that the hiring probability is low when competing applicants are able.

ABSTRACT We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.

We investigate the consequences of public disclosure of information from company income tax returns filed in Australia. Supporters of more disclosure argue that increased transparency will improve tax compliance, while opponents argue that it will divulge sensitive information that is, in many cases, misunderstood. Our results show that in Australia large private companies experienced some consumer backlash and, perhaps partly in anticipation, some acted to avoid disclosure. We detect a small increase (decrease) in tax payments for private (public) firms subject to disclosure suggesting differential costs of disclosure across firms. Finally, we find that investors react negatively to anticipated and actual disclosure of tax information, most likely due to anticipated policy backlash rather than consumer backlash or the revelation of negative information about cash flows. These findings are important for both managers and policy makers, as the trend towards increased tax disclosure continues to rise globally.

Individual deposits in the United States grew from 5% to 23% of GDP between 1863 and 1913. A comprehensive database shows bank entry underlying this trend while historical events, including the National Banking Acts, resumption in 1879, and the election of 1896, influenced deposits at the bank-level. The nation's embrace of deposits was thus driven by stability of the monetary system and confidence in the safety and utility of established and well-capitalized banks. Bank-level and county-level regressions confirm these patterns for national banks over the entire postbellum period and for a sample of Midwest state and national banks from 1888.