I provide a measure for the value that investors place on trust and relationships in asset management by examining mutual fund flows around announced changes in the ownership of fund management companies. I find a decline in flows of around 7% of fund assets in the year following the announcement date, resulting primarily from fund outflows. Retail investors and investors in funds with higher expense ratios are most responsive to ownership changes, providing evidence that such investors appear to place a significant value on trust and are more likely to respond to a relationship disruption by withdrawing their assets.

This paper examines how political connections affect risk exposure of financial institutions. Using a geography-based measure, I find that politically connected firms have higher leverage and their stocks have higher volatility and beta. Furthermore, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, politically-connected financial firms had higher leverage and were more likely to increase their leverage during the housing bubble in response to local growth in median housing prices. During the crisis, higher leverage was associated with worse performance but being in a state with a US Senator on the Banking Committee was correlated with weakly improved stock returns and reduced bankruptcy probability, highlighting the value of political connections for financial firms.

I provide a measure for the value that investors place on trust and relationships in asset management by examining mutual fund flows around announced changes in the ownership of fund management companies. I find a decline in flows of around 7% of fund assets in the year following the announcement date, resulting primarily from fund outflows. Retail investors and investors in funds with higher expense ratios are most responsive to ownership changes, providing evidence that such investors appear to place a significant value on trust and are more likely to respond to a relationship disruption by withdrawing their assets. Received September 13, 2013; accepted August 10, 2015 by Editor Laura Starks.

The market for passive ETFs and passive ETF benchmarks has exploded. Passive ETF sponsors get index benchmarks mainly from brand name index providers such as S&P and Russell. We show how benchmark and index provider characteristics are relevant for sponsors and different investor types. ETF benchmarks from large index providers attract more capital. Institutional flows exhibit a strong preference for brand name benchmarks, but do-it-yourself retail investor flows do not. ETFs that change benchmarks reduce their tracking error and have 7% higher flows in the subsequent three months, again driven by institutional flows.

Using the firm-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, we find that firms score higher on CSR when they have Democratic rather than Republican founders, CEOs, and directors, and when they are headquartered in Democratic rather than Republican-leaning states. Democratic-leaning firms spend 20 million more on CSR than Republican-leaning firms (80 million more within the sample of S&P 500 firms), or roughly 10% of net income. We find no evidence that firms recover these expenditures through increased sales. Indeed, increases in firm CSR ratings are associated with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA, suggesting that any benefits to stakeholders from social responsibility come at the direct expense of firm value.

We study managerial turnover for both internally managed mutual funds and those managed externally by subadvisors. We argue that turnover of subadvisors provides sharper tests and helps address several unresolved issues and puzzles from the previous literature. We find dramatically stronger inverse relations between subadvisor departures and lagged returns, and new evidence on how past flow predicts turnover. We find no evidence of improvements in return performance related to departures, but flow improvements are associated with departures of poor past performers. Our findings represent new evidence on how investors, sponsors, and boards learn about and evaluate mutual fund management performance.

We analyze a dataset of 2390 completed ICOs, which raised a total of $12 billion in capital, nearly all since January 2017. We find evidence of significant ICO underpricing, with average returns of 179% from the ICO price to the first day's opening market price, over a holding period that averages just 16 days. After trading begins, tokens continue to appreciate in price, generating average buy-and-hold abnormal returns of 48% in the first 30 trading days. We also study the determinants of ICO underpricing and relate cryptocurrency prices to Twitter activity.

ABSTRACT We study innovation and product differentiation using a uniqueness measure based on textual analysis of prospectuses. We find that small and start‐up families have higher start rates than larger families, and their products are more unique. Unique strategies attract more inflows in the first three years, and investors respond more to text‐based uniqueness than other measures such as holdings or returns uniqueness. For established funds, word uniqueness has weak negative power for explaining returns, so investors in competitive equilibrium do not sacrifice much performance to get specialized products. Uniqueness attenuates the flow‐performance relation, reducing the risk of investor outflows.

Using data on the political contributions and stock holdings of U.S. investment managers, we find that mutual fund managers who make campaign donations to Democrats hold less of their portfolios (relative to non-donors or Republican donors) in companies that are deemed socially irresponsible (e.g., tobacco, guns, or defense firms or companies with bad employee relations or diversity records). Although explicit socially responsible investing (SRI) funds are more likely to be managed by Democratic managers, this result holds for non-SRI funds and after controlling for other fund and manager characteristics. The effect is more than one-half of the underweighting observed for SRI funds.