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Capital-Account Liberalization as a Signal

American Economic Review 1997 87(1), 138-154
We present a model in which a government's current capital-control policy signals future policies. Controls on capital outflows evolve in response to news on technology, conditional on government attitudes toward taxation of capital. When there is uncertainty over government types, a policy of liberal capital outflows sends a favorable signal that may trigger a capital inflow. This prediction is consistent with the experience of several countries that have liberalized their capital accounts.

Settlement delays in the money market

Journal of Banking & Finance 2010 34(5), 934-945 open access
We track 38,000 money market trades from execution to delivery and return, and provide a first empirical analysis of settlement delays in financial markets. In accord with the predictions of recent models of strategic settlement of financial claims, we document a tendency by lenders to delay delivery of loaned funds until the afternoon hours. We find banks to follow a simple strategy to manage the risk of account overdrafts, by delaying settlement of large payments relative to that of small payments. More sophisticated strategies such as increasing delays when own liquid balances are low and when dealing with small trading partners play a marginal role. We find evidence of strategic delay also when returning borrowed funds, although we can explain a smaller fraction of the dispersion in delays in the return than in delivery leg of money market lending.

Collateral Values by Asset Class: Evidence from Primary Securities Dealers

Review of Financial Studies 2011 24(1), 248-278
[Using data on repurchase agreements by primary securities dealers, we show that three classes of securities (Treasury securities, securities issued by government-sponsored agencies, and mortgage-backed securities) can be formally ranked in terms of their collateral values in the general collateral (GC) market. We then show that GC repurchase agreement (repo) spreads across asset classes display jumps and significant temporal variation, especially at times of predictable liquidity needs, consistent with the "safe haven" properties of Treasury securities: These jumps are driven almost entirely by the behavior of the GC repo rates of Treasury securities. Estimating the "collateral rents" earned by owners of these securities, we find such rents to be sizable for Treasury securities and nearly zero for agency and mortgage-backed securities. Finally, we link collateral values to asset prices in a simple no-arbitrage framework and show that variations in collateral values explain a significant fraction of changes in short-term yield spreads but not those of longer-term spreads.Our results point to securities' role as collateral as a promising direction of research to improve understanding of the pricing of money market securities and their spreads.]

The overnight interbank market: Evidence from the G-7 and the Euro zone

Journal of Banking & Finance 2003 27(10), 2045-2083
We study the interbank markets for overnight loans of the major industrial countries, linking the behavior of short-term interest rates to the operating procedures of these countries’ central banks. We find that many of the key behavioral features of US federal funds rates, on which previous studies have focused, are not robust to changes in institutional details, along both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of the data. Our results indicate that central banks’ operating procedures and intervention styles play a crucial role in shaping empirical features of short-term interest rates’ day to-to-day behavior in industrial countries.

Banks’ reserve management, transaction costs, and the timing of Federal Reserve intervention

Journal of Banking & Finance 2001 25(7), 1287-1317
We use daily data on bank reserves and overnight interest rates to document a striking pattern in the high-frequency behavior of the US market for federal funds: depository institutions tend to hold more reserves during the last few days of each “reserve maintenance period”, when the opportunity cost of holding reserves is typically highest. We then propose and analyze a model of the federal funds market where uncertain liquidity flows and transaction costs induce banks to delay trading and to bid up interest rates at the end of each maintenance period. In this context, the central bank’s interest-rate-smoothing policy causes a high supply of liquid funds to be associated with high interest rates around reserve-settlement days.

Collateral Values by Asset Class: Evidence from Primary Securities Dealers

Review of Financial Studies 2011 24(1), 248-278
Using data on repurchase agreements by primary securities dealers, we show that three classes of securities (Treasury securities, securities issued by government-sponsored agencies, and mortgage-backed securities) can be formally ranked in terms of their collateral values in the general collateral (GC) market. We then show that GC repurchase agreement (repo) spreads across asset classes display jumps and significant temporal variation, especially at times of predictable liquidity needs, consistent with the "safe haven" properties of Treasury securities: These jumps are driven almost entirely by the behavior of the GC repo rates of Treasury securities. Estimating the "collateral rents" earned by owners of these securities, we find such rents to be sizable for Treasury securities and nearly zero for agency and mortgage-backed securities. Finally, we link collateral values to asset prices in a simple no-arbitrage framework and show that variations in collateral values explain a significant fraction of changes in short-term yield spreads but not those of longer-term spreads. Our results point to securities' role as collateral as a promising direction of research to improve understanding of the pricing of money market securities and their spreads. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.